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929 
GROSS ERROR 
Eric Berger

 
Abstract: Glossip v. Gross epitomizes judicial deference gone berserk. In rejecting an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, the United States 
Supreme Court rested its holding on several forms of deference. Closer examination 
demonstrates that each of these unsupported deference determinations was, at best, 
contestable and, at worst, simply wrong. Far from being anomalous, such under-theorized 
deference reflects more generally the Court’s willingness to utilize various stealth 
determinations to manipulate outcomes in constitutional cases. 
The understandable concern that frivolous lethal injection challenges will clog courts and 
delay executions likely motivated the Court’s approach. Remarkably, though, the Court did 
not even attempt to distinguish humane execution protocols from dangerous ones. Many 
states, including Oklahoma, have repeatedly shown that they cannot be trusted to implement 
lethal injection procedures carefully. The Court’s deference turned a blind eye to this history 
and upheld a manifestly dangerous execution procedure. In so doing, the Court tried to shut 
down an entire category of litigation, thereby abdicating its constitutional responsibility to 
safeguard individual rights. Regardless of one’s views on capital punishment, Glossip v. 
Gross’s reflexive deference determinations collectively amount to gross error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I recently found myself chatting at a party with an anesthesiology 
professor at an elite university hospital. A couple of weeks earlier the 
Supreme Court had handed down its decision in Glossip v. Gross,
1
 so I 
asked him about lethal injection. He raised his hand gently but 
authoritatively. 
“I know some people like to say that lethal injection is of necessity 
painful,” he said,  
but it’s very easy to kill somebody painlessly. Seventeen million 
patients a year are rendered unconscious and without pain 
during the cutting and sewing of tissue during surgery with 
greater than 99.9% reliability. Any trained anesthesiologist has 
the technical skills to render someone insensate or dead with a 
minimum of discomfort if provided with the proper drugs and 
equipment. 
I asked him if he was familiar with the details of the Oklahoma 
execution procedure at issue in Glossip. He was not, so I summarized it 
quickly. Three drugs: midazolam to anesthetize, followed by a paralytic, 
followed by potassium chloride, which creates an excruciating burning 
sensation in the veins on its way to stopping the heart. He shook his 
head. I had made a mistake. 
“Midazolam’s not a general anesthetic,” he explained. “They 
shouldn’t be using that. It will not reliably produce unconsciousness or 
relief of pain.” 
I assured him that I had the drug sequence correct—and that the 
Supreme Court had rejected a constitutional challenge to it. 
“Midazolam?” he asked, incredulously. 
I nodded. 
His cousin, a nurse with many years’ experience in the operating 
room, wandered over, and he summarized our conversation for her. 
“Midazolam?! But that’s crazy!” she said. 
“And the Supreme Court said that that’s OK,” the anesthesiologist 
repeated in disbelief. 
“That . . . is . . . crazy!” 
                                                     
1. __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
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They both stared at me for longer than a moment, as if the Court’s 
bizarre medical conclusions were an indictment of my entire 
profession . . . as if to say, “What is it with you lawyers?!”2 
* * * 
Lethal injection returned to the U.S. Supreme Court recently in 
Glossip v. Gross. A group of death row inmates contended that 
Oklahoma’s new lethal injection protocol created too great a risk of 
excruciating pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“cruel and unusual punishments.”3 The crux of their case was that the 
protocol’s first drug, midazolam, fails to anesthetize against the agony 
the second and third drugs indisputably cause.
4
 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments and upheld the Oklahoma 
protocol. In a sense, this outcome was predictable. The Supreme Court 
has never held that a state’s method of execution violates the Eighth 
Amendment, and, in this case, the Court was merely reviewing the 
district court’s factual findings for clear error.5 Moreover, as the Court 
emphasized, states have had increasing difficulty obtaining drugs for 
lethal injection procedures, and the Court did not want to make their task 
even harder. From that perspective, the Glossip decision is unsurprising. 
A closer look, however, raises serious questions about the Court’s 
approach. In particular, the Court premised its holding on various sorts 
of deference. First, the Court deferred to the trial court’s factual findings 
because it determined they were not clearly erroneous. Second, the Court 
deferred to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC), 
emphasizing that the judiciary’s own epistemic limitations made it the 
wrong institution to disrupt the judgment of state officials who had 
designed the execution procedure. Third, the Court crafted a deferential 
doctrinal test raising a high Eighth Amendment bar for condemned 
inmates seeking to challenge a lethal injection procedure. Fourth, the 
Court emphasized certain questionable “facts” in its analysis and 
completely ignored others. In this way, the Court offered a spin that 
ostensibly justified its outcome. 
These kinds of deference, to be sure, are very different from each 
other (and the fourth, strictly speaking, is not really “deference” at all). 
                                                     
2. Conversation with Dr. Ian Carroll, Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology, Stanford School of 
Medicine, in Scituate, Mass. (July 9, 2015). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
4. See Brief for Petitioners at 25–26, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-7955) [hereinafter 
Petitioners’ Brief].  
5. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739.  
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That said, they each discourage the Court from inquiring too seriously 
into the challenged policy. Each cuts in favor of judicial passivity so that 
the Court will not second-guess the State’s chosen policy or the district 
court’s findings. 
In some cases, judicial deference is perfectly appropriate, but the 
Court’s deference determinations in Glossip were highly questionable. 
To begin, the majority’s deference to the trial court’s factual findings 
was problematic both formally and contextually. From a formal 
standpoint, the Court treated the question as a pure issue of 
“adjudicative,” case-specific fact triggering “clear-error” review.6 Upon 
closer examination, the Court should have at least entertained the 
argument that the relevant scientific facts should have been reviewed 
under the de novo standard applicable to more generalizable (i.e., non-
case specific) “legislative” facts.7 Moreover, Glossip considered a 
question of constitutional fact, which also triggers more searching 
review.
8
 From this perspective, the Court rushed too quickly to apply the 
clear-error standard. 
Even assuming, however, that the clear-error standard was formally 
appropriate, the district court refused to hold a full trial, permitting only 
a limited evidentiary hearing.
9
 The plaintiffs at this hearing did not even 
have the opportunity to offer evidence rebutting the State’s expert 
witness.
10
 These procedural anomalies render the Court’s deferential 
standard of review even more problematic. 
The Court also applied this already deferential standard with even 
more deference, upholding the district court’s dubious assessment of the 
record. The Court, for instance, accepted the district court’s conclusion 
that midazolam could sufficiently anesthetize inmates against 
                                                     
6. See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942).  
7. See infra notes 77–96 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 97–105 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra Part II.A.2. The district court and Tenth Circuit cases were captioned “Warner v. 
Gross.” Before the Supreme Court’s decision, Oklahoma executed Charles Warner, despite four 
Justices’ votes for a stay of execution. See Warner v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 824 (Jan. 15, 
2015) (No. 14-7955) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of stay of execution). The 
execution of the case’s lead plaintiff required a change in the litigation’s caption. For ease of 
presentation, I refer herein to the case by the Supreme Court caption, Glossip v. Gross, except in 
footnotes citing the district court record. (I also cite the defendant’s name in my title to facilitate a 
shameless pun).  
10. See Transcript of Pretrial Conference Hearing (Dec. 15, 2014), at 15, Warner v. Gross, 776 
F.3d 721 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 14-665) (noting that plaintiffs will not have opportunity to rebut 
defendant’s witness) [hereinafter Warner Pretrial Conference].  
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excruciating pain.
11
 This conclusion, however, was based on the 
testimony of one expert, who based his views on a questionable website 
for a lay audience, not on peer-reviewed medical scholarship. The other 
testifying experts, who did cite medical journals and textbooks to bolster 
their assertions, contended that midazolam cannot produce 
unconsciousness and maintain anesthesia against painful stimuli.
12
 
Nor was the Court’s institutional deference any more sound. The 
majority emphasized its own epistemic limitations, noting that 
“challenges to lethal injection protocols test the boundaries of the 
authority and competency of federal courts.”13 This sort of deference to 
state actors premised on the judiciary’s institutional limitations is 
questionable if the state institution itself suffers from serious 
limitations.
14
 When the state agency lacks both political and epistemic 
authority, the notion that courts ought not get involved because they lack 
these qualities is far less persuasive.
15
 After all, judges can study the 
relevant evidence, and, in this instance, Oklahoma officials did not even 
do that. 
The Court also articulated a new and extremely deferential Eighth 
Amendment standard. Unlike the first two examples of deference, which 
were external to the doctrinal test, the Court baked this deference into 
the constitutional doctrine itself. Ignoring important language from 
earlier cases, the Court required inmates to establish that the challenged 
lethal injection procedure be “sure or very likely” to cause great pain.16 
The result appears to be that even dangerous execution procedures will 
pass constitutional muster if they are not “sure or very likely” to result in 
excruciating suffering. Framed this way, a lethal injection plaintiff 
armed even with favorable factual findings is likely to lose. This 
doctrinal move essentially transformed the Eighth Amendment in this 
context from an individual rights clause to a federalism provision 
protecting states. 
Finally, the Court offered its own spin on important facts surrounding 
the case. The Court did not explain how these facts were legally 
                                                     
11. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015). 
12. See infra notes 139–47 and accompanying text. 
13. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2740.  
14. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in 
Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2067–69 (2011).  
15. See id. at 2032–37, 2074–77; Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth 
Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 
39–59 (2010). 
16. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1523 (2008)). 
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relevant, but its factual portrait helped create an atmosphere ostensibly 
justifying its other highly deferential moves. For example, the Court 
inaccurately blamed the drug shortage bedeviling lethal injection states 
on anti-death penalty activists and suggested that the inmates should not 
benefit from a situation they have helped create.
17
 Accordingly, the 
Court implied, the judiciary owes states the benefit of the doubt. 
Along similar lines, Justice Alito described each of the inmate’s 
crimes. While these crimes were horrific and arguably justify the 
imposition of capital punishment, they are nonetheless irrelevant to the 
question of whether the State’s protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. 
By contrast, the Court did not once mention the fact that the protocol’s 
third drug, potassium chloride, indisputably causes searing pain in the 
improperly anesthetized. Nor did the majority engage meaningfully with 
the long history of botched executions, which help demonstrate that 
many state officials do not know or care enough to design humane lethal 
injection protocols. The Court, in short, highlighted irrelevant facts at 
the expense of relevant ones, thereby crafting an opinion uniquely 
sensitive to state interests. 
Of course, the Court had reasons for its approach. Many capital 
inmates will challenge any method of execution, no matter how humane, 
clogging courts and delaying the administration of justice.
18
 Impatient 
with such litigation, the majority tried to make it more difficult for 
capital inmates to bring lethal injection challenges at all. In this way, the 
Court sought to discourage frivolous litigation while simultaneously 
protecting states’ prerogative to design and implement execution 
protocols. 
The problem is that the Court’s opinion failed to distinguish safe 
lethal injection procedures from dangerous ones. It did not even attempt 
to do so. Indeed, the Court was so concerned about frivolous litigation 
that it crafted an opinion that tries to shut the door on meritorious cases 
as well. And, while there likely are frivolous lethal injection claims, 
there also certainly are meritorious ones. States have repeatedly made 
serious mistakes when designing and implementing lethal injection 
protocols, thereby greatly heightening the risk that the condemned will 
suffer an excruciating death. Oklahoma, in fact, is one of the worst 
                                                     
17. See infra Part II.D.2.a.  
18. See infra Part III.A.1.  
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offenders, as the horrific botched 2014 execution of Clayton Lockett 
well demonstrates.
19
 
The Court’s approach in Glossip creates serious problems for the law 
of lethal injection. Glossip strongly implies that law that might interfere 
with executions should take a back seat to the imperative of carrying out 
death sentences. Lethal injection, then, operates in a strange legal grey 
hole in which the politics of capital punishment apparently trumps the 
Constitution.
20
 To be sure, the Eighth Amendment ostensibly protects 
inmates from excruciating execution procedures. However, as a practical 
matter, the Court applies the law so deferentially that those protections 
are only illusory.
21
 
Glossip also has broader implications beyond the death penalty. In 
particular, it illustrates that deference in its various forms is easily 
manipulated. This Article seeks to illustrate some of these many 
deference determinations at the Court’s disposal. It does not offer a 
meta-theory for each variant; each type of deference is itself rich and 
complicated enough to merit individual treatment.
22
 But by examining 
deference in Glossip, we can better understand how poorly the Court 
sometimes justifies its constitutional decisions. To this extent, Glossip’s 
under-theorized deference reflects more generally the Court’s ability to 
utilize various stealth determinations to steer outcomes in constitutional 
cases.
23
 
Many states, including Oklahoma, have repeatedly shown they do not 
understand the drugs and their risks, and that they cannot be trusted to 
employ competent persons to carry out lethal injection’s many 
complicated steps safely.
24
 Glossip’s quadruple deference turns a blind 
eye to this history, giving the benefit of the doubt that many lethal 
injection states, including Oklahoma, do not deserve. This is not to say 
                                                     
19. See generally Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-
lockett/392069/ [https://perma.cc/8K63-NT7Y].  
20. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2009) (“Grey holes . . . arise when there are some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a 
lawless void—but the constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do 
as it pleases.”). 
21. Cf. id. at 1118 (“The problem with grey holes . . . is that the apparent constraints on executive 
action mask the lack of actual constraints.”). 
22. In earlier work, I offered such a treatment for judicial review of agency action allegedly 
violating individual rights. See generally Berger, supra note 14. 
23. See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 465, 494–98 (2013). 
24. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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that appellate deference to trial court factual findings or judicial 
deference to governmental action is never warranted. The point, rather, 
is that the Court’s under-theorized deference allowed it to bless 
extremely haphazard, secretive, and unprofessional governmental 
actions. By rushing to defer in Glossip v. Gross and attempting to 
foreclose future method-of-execution challenges, the Court abdicated its 
responsibility to safeguard constitutional rights. Regardless of one’s 
views on capital punishment, such reflexive deference determinations 
collectively amount to gross error. 
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the relevant background. It 
opens with a short history of lethal injection before turning to the 
Oklahoma protocol at issue in Glossip. It then recounts the district 
court’s proceedings and the Supreme Court opinion. 
Part II examines the various kinds of deference at issue. It first looks 
at the Court’s deference to the trial court factual findings and contends 
that the Court failed to discuss important factors militating against clear-
error review. It then turns to the Court’s institutional deference to the 
Oklahoma DOC. Though the Court raised valid concerns about its own 
epistemic limitations, it completely ignored the lack of expertise and 
care that has repeatedly plagued lethal injection in Oklahoma and 
elsewhere. Next, the Article examines the Court’s highly deferential 
Eighth Amendment standard, arguing that this new articulation of the 
doctrine is in tension with relevant precedent and core Eighth 
Amendment norms. Finally, this Part considers deference as atmospheric 
spin, considering important facts that the Court ignored and other 
factually questionable or legally irrelevant points that the Court 
emphasized. 
Part III considers motives for and implications of the Court’s 
exceptionally deferential approach. In particular, it focuses on the 
Court’s concern that frivolous lethal injection litigation may clog courts 
and obstruct states’ administration of justice. The Article concludes that 
while these concerns are valid, the Court inappropriately ignored 
numerous other factors militating for more careful judicial review here. 
Indeed, the history of botched executions well demonstrates that the 
Court’s great deference to states in this area is undeserved. Moreover, 
under-theorized deference yields decisions that read more like partisan 
advocacy briefs than impartial court opinions, thus compromising 
judicial legitimacy. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Lethal Injection Generally 
In 1977 Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection 
when it devised a three-drug protocol.
25
 Over thirty states subsequently 
copied Oklahoma’s approach, and some still retain it today in name.26 
This protocol began with sodium thiopental, a barbiturate to anesthetize 
the inmate. The second drug, pancuronium bromide, was a paralytic that 
inhibits muscle movement. The third drug, potassium chloride, stopped 
the heart. It was undisputed that a successfully delivered adequate dose 
of thiopental would fully anesthetize the inmate within two-and-a-half 
minutes.
27
 It was further undisputed that if the thiopental failed to take 
full effect, the potassium chloride would cause excruciating pain as it 
burns its way through the inmate’s veins.28 The paralytic, however, 
would conceal that agony—and also cause the torturous sensation of 
suffocation by paralyzing the inmate’s diaphragm.29 
The safety and constitutionality of this three-drug protocol, therefore, 
hinged on the successful delivery of thiopental.
30
 Unfortunately, states 
often entrusted the procedure to unqualified personnel. Indeed, the 
doctor who initially designed the protocol for Oklahoma subsequently 
expressed shock that individuals with little understanding of the drugs’ 
dangers typically implement it.
31
 
Inmates in various states challenged the constitutionality of their 
states’ three-drug protocols. Many contended that various problems with 
                                                     
25. See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the 
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 65 (2007). 
26. In practice, states today cannot find thiopental for their protocols and have replaced it with 
other drugs. See id. at 78; infra notes 41–46, 392–401 and accompanying text. 
27. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 259, 265 (2009). 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (“It is 
uncontested that, failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental that would render the prisoner 
unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the 
administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride.”). A 
“safe” execution procedure is one that does not pose a substantial risk of serious pain. Obviously, to 
the extent these procedures cause the death of a human being, they are not “safe” in the 
conventional sense of the word. See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment 
Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1370 n.11 (2014). 
31. See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (citing Email from A. Jay 
Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Deborah W. Denno, Professor of Law, 
Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)).  
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their states’ procedures heightened the risk that they would not receive a 
proper dose of thiopental and therefore would suffer an excruciating 
death. Some plaintiffs persuaded courts that particular states’ procedures 
were unconstitutional.
32
 However, in 2008, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld Kentucky’s three-drug protocol in Baze v. Rees.33 Baze 
considered only the constitutionality of Kentucky’s procedure, and the 
record in that case was sparse, so the Court’s decision did not determine 
the constitutionality of other states’ procedures.34 Moreover, because 
Baze was a fractured decision and even the plurality opinion could be 
read as identifying different Eighth Amendment legal standards, the case 
left much unsettled.
35
 Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court had 
indicated that procedures “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s would 
pass Eighth Amendment muster,
36
 other states felt confident that they 
could continue with the three-drug protocol. 
Events on the ground changed quickly.
37
 Despite Baze, an Ohio state 
court held in State v. Rivera that the State’s use of pancuronium bromide 
and potassium chloride “creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that 
the condemned will experience an agonizing and painful death.”38 The 
court ordered Ohio to adopt a one-drug protocol using only an 
anesthetic, a change that Ohio ultimately adopted by statute.
39
 Several 
other states soon followed suit, adopting one-drug procedures using 
overdoses of anesthetics like thiopental and pentobarbital.
40
 
The one-drug protocol ostensibly eliminated the risk of severe pain. 
By removing the two drugs that created the primary risk of pain, some 
                                                     
32. See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (“The new protocol poses a substantial risk that Mr. 
Harbison will not be unconscious when the second and third drugs are administered.”); Taylor v. 
Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7–8 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006), rev’d 487 F.3d 
1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
33. Baze, 553 U.S. at 63. 
34. See Berger, supra note 27, at 273.  
35. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality’s opinion, far from 
settling the issue, will generate further debate); id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
plurality opinion “casts constitutional doubt on long-accepted methods of execution”); Deborah W. 
Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1332, 1347–48 (2014) (arguing that Baze 
refers to several risk standards). 
36. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 61.  
37. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1354. 
38. State v. Rivera, No. 04CR065940, 2008 WL 2784679, at *5 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 
2008). 
39. See Adam Liptak & Adam B. Ellick, Judge Orders Ohio to Alter Its Method of Execution, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/us/11death.html?r=0& 
pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/G65Q-NP3N].  
40. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1380.  
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states were now relying solely on drugs intended to protect inmates from 
pain. However, states with both one- and multi-drug procedures soon ran 
into problems obtaining the drugs. In particular, some pharmaceutical 
companies, responding partially to pressure from European 
governments, stopped selling their products to states for use in 
executions.
41
 Other drugs were also in short supply for reasons 
unconnected to the death penalty.
42
 
In response to these drug shortages, states have taken desperate steps 
to procure drugs.
43
 Some states have sought to purchase drugs from 
unregistered overseas dealers in defiance of federal law, which prohibits 
the importation of such unapproved drugs.
44
 Other states have turned to 
compounding pharmacies, though those facilities often lack the basic 
infrastructure and technology to produce reliable drugs.
45
 Still other 
states changed their protocol to include different drugs, such as a three-
drug protocol replacing thiopental with pentobarbital as the anesthetic.
46
 
Thus, whereas most state lethal injection protocols resembled each other 
when the Court decided Baze in 2008, today there is an array of different 
protocols across the country. 
B. Lethal Injection in Oklahoma 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection procedure has been especially 
problematic. When the State executed Michael Lee Wilson with a three-
drug protocol beginning with pentobarbital in January 2014, he cried out 
                                                     
41. See James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the International Moral 
Marketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1236–39 (2015).  
42. See infra notes 402–406 and accompanying text. 
43. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1381. 
44. See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Owen Bowcott, London Firm 
Supplied Drugs for US Executions, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/06/london-firm-supplied-drugs-us-executions 
[https://perma.cc/3P7Z-ZJN8]; Amanda Holpuch, Nebraska’s Attempt to Import Lethal Injection 
Drugs from India Failed, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/sep/17/nebraska-lethal-injection-drugs-india-failed [https://perma.cc/7EG8-NF8R] 
(explaining that Nebraska attempted to illegally obtain lethal injection drugs from overseas). 
45. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1383; Bette Hileman, Drug Regulation, Compounding 
Pharmacies Pose Unrecognized Dangers, Expand Beyond FDA Restrictions, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS (Apr. 12, 2004), http://pubs.acs.org/email/cen/html/041204145623.html 
[https://perma.cc/ALN5-QEQG]; Ed Silverman, Safety Issues at Compounding Pharmacy 
Underscore Oversight Problems, STAT (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/ 
04/08/compounding-pharmacy-drug-safety-fda/ [https://perma.cc/K996-RQ7R]. 
46. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1376; State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/7LF8-PHXQ]. 
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from the gurney, “I feel my whole body burning.”47 Oklahoma initially 
planned no changes to its protocol,
48
 but the State’s plans changed in 
mid-March 2014 when a deal with a pharmacy supplying pentobarbital 
“fell through.”49 Oklahoma, thus, rescheduled executions for Clayton 
Lockett and Charles Warner for late April and set to work on a new 
execution protocol.
50
 
Rather than carefully exploring its options, Oklahoma officials rushed 
to throw something together. Oklahoma delegated the design of the new 
protocol to a team of lawyers working under enormous time pressure.
51
 
Just four days after announcing the drug shortage, the State adopted a 
new three-drug protocol that substituted midazolam as the anesthetic.
52
 
Serious problems arose immediately. The State planned to execute 
both Lockett and Warner with this new protocol on the same evening in 
April 2014, but Lockett’s execution was horribly botched.53 After a 
doctor declared Lockett unconscious, the State administered the 
paralytic, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.
54
 Lockett’s 
body then began to twitch, and he tried to rise off the gurney in visible 
distress.
55
 As Mr. Lockett continued to mumble, strain, and writhe in 
agony, the State drew the blinds, blocking witnesses’ views.56 Lockett 
did ultimately die, but the State postponed the Warner execution.
57
 
                                                     
47. See Charlotte Alter, Oklahoma Convict Who Felt “Body Burning” Executed with 
Controversial Drug, TIME, (Jan. 10, 2014), http://nation.time.com/2014/01/10/oklahoma-convict-
who-felt-body-burning-executed-with-controversial-drug/ [https://perma.cc/R9V7-T8AR].  
48. See Ashton Edwards, Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections: No Plans to Review Lethal Injection 
Protocol, KFOR NEWSCHANNEL4, (Jan. 28, 2014), http://kfor.com/2014/01/28/oklahoma-dept-of-
corrections-no-plans-to-review-lethal-injection-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/J69W-7AUV].  
49. See Brief of Former State Attorneys General as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955) [hereinafter State AG Brief]. 
50. See Alter, supra note 47. 
51. See infra Parts II.B.1.b & II.B.2.  
52. See State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 7. 
53. See Erik Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/oklahoma-executions.html [https://perma.cc/U893-
N4ST]. 
54. Id. The differences between vecuronium and pancuronium bromide are not significant for 
purposes of lethal injection litigation. Cf. O.M. Rashkovsky, Interaction Between Pancuronium 
Bromide and Vecuronium Bromide, 57 BR. J. ANAESTH. 1063, 1063 (1985) (noting that vecuronium 
and pancuronium bormide are “closely related” and work similarly in many, but not all, respects). 
55. See Eckholm, supra note 53; Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Execution: Clayton Lockett Writhes 
on Gurney in Botched Procedure, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2014/apr/30/oklahoma-execution-botched-clayton-lockett [https://perma.cc/Z7SF-HDTW] 
(providing eyewitness account of Lockett execution). 
56. See Interview by Captain Damon Tucker & Lieutenant Brent Jones, Okla. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, Okla. Highway Patrol, with Gary Elliott, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Okla. Dep’t of Corr., in 
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Following this botch, Oklahoma again revised its protocol.
58
 Instead 
of replacing midazolam with another drug, the State merely increased 
the dosage of midazolam from 100 to 500 milligrams.
59
 When Oklahoma 
finally executed Warner using this protocol, his last words were, “My 
body is on fire.”60 
C. District Court Proceedings 
Twenty-one Oklahoma capital inmates filed a civil rights action in 
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the 
constitutionality of this same protocol.
61
 Four of these inmates 
subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary injunction barring their 
executions until the court could resolve their Section 1983 claim.
62
 The 
district court held a three-day preliminary injunction hearing focused, 
inter alia, on midazolam’s properties. If midazolam cannot anesthetize 
inmates against the excruciating pain caused by potassium chloride, then 
the Oklahoma protocol would manifestly violate the Eighth 
Amendment.
63
 If midazolam, by contrast, were a suitable anesthetic that 
could reliably anesthetize inmates against such pain, then Oklahoma’s 
three-drug protocol would not constitute a per se violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, though the procedure may still be unconstitutional if the 
                                                     
Oklahoma City, Okla., Transcript at 10 (May 27, 2014) [hereinafter Elliott Interview]; Interview by 
Captain Jason Holt & Trooper Kevin Logan, Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Okla. Highway Patrol, 
with Robert Patton, Dir., Okla. Dep’t of Corr., in Oklahoma City, Okla., Transcript at 32 (June 3, 
2014) [hereinafter Patton Interview]. 
57. See Eckholm, supra note 53; Ariane de Vogue, New Documents Reveal Botched Oklahoma 
Execution Details, CNN POL. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/16/politics/clayton-
lockett-oklahoma-execution/ [https://perma.cc/3A5M-UKEH]. 
58. See generally OKLA. DEP’T OF CORR., PREPARATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF CHEMICALS 
(2014) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA PROTOCOL]; Oklahoma Unveils New Execution Procedures, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/30/oklahoma-
execution-procedures/16508213/ [https://perma.cc/T74P-6LFN]. 
59. See OKLAHOMA PROTOCOL, supra note 58, at 3.  
60. See Andrew Buncombe, Charles Warner Execution: Oklahoma Inmate’s Last Words Are ‘My 
Body Is on Fire’ as State Carries out First Death Penalty in Nine Months, INDEP. (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/charles-warner-execution-my-body-is-on-fire-
9981842.html [https://perma.cc/9GZT-XS43].  
61. Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 
S. Ct. 2726 (2015). Oklahoma’s protocol allows the DOC to choose from four different drug 
combinations, but the State indicated that it planned to use a three-drug protocol consisting of 
midazolam, a paralytic, and potassium chloride. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734.  
62. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Warner v. Gross, No. CIV-14-0665-F (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 22 2014). 
63. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 25. 
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State’s administration of it did not sufficiently assure that the inmate 
would be anesthetized. 
The plaintiffs offered three expert witnesses, Dr. David Lubarsky, Dr. 
Larry Sasich, and Dr. Eric Katz, each of whom testified that midazolam 
could not reliably anesthetize the inmates against the intense pain 
inflicted by potassium chloride.
64
 The State’s witness, Dr. Roswell 
Evans, contended that midazolam could in fact anesthetize the inmates.
65
 
After hearing the evidence, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction, because the plaintiffs had failed to 
establish the likelihood of success on the merits. It rested this holding on 
two independent reasons. First, the district court faulted the plaintiffs for 
failing to identify a known and available alternative method of execution 
that substantially lessened the risk of pain.
66
 Second, the court concluded 
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the Oklahoma protocol 
“presents a risk that is ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and 
needless suffering.’”67 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, without holding oral 
argument, affirmed.
68
 
D. The Supreme Court Decision 
The United States Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, also affirmed. The 
majority opinion by Justice Samuel Alito reiterated the district court’s 
rationales. First, the Court affirmed “based on petitioners’ failure to 
satisfy their burden of establishing that any risk of harm was substantial 
when compared to a known and available alternative method of 
execution.”69 Second, the Court held that the district court had not 
committed clear error “when it found that midazolam is highly likely to 
render a person unable to feel pain during an execution.”70 
In elaborating on this second point, Justice Alito placed great weight 
on the standard of review, emphasizing that the “clear error” standard 
does not entitle appellate courts “to overturn a finding ‘simply because 
[they are] convinced that [they] would have decided the case 
                                                     
64. See Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Dec. 17-19, 2014), at 102–53, 333–94, 
555–604, Warner, No. CIV-14-0665-F [hereinafter Warner PI Hearing]. 
65. See id. at 629–78. 
66. See Transcript of Court’s Ruling (Dec. 22, 2014), at 67, Warner, No. CIV-14-0665-F 
[hereinafter Warner Ruling]. 
67. See id. at 65. 
68. See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 724 n.1, 736 (10th Cir.), aff’d sub nom. Glossip v. Gross, 
__ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
69. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738.  
70. Id. at 2739. 
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differently.’”71 In her dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor contended that an 
appellate court should find clear error when it “is left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”72 Given the 
testimony at the evidentiary hearing and voluminous scientific literature 
detailing midazolam’s properties, Justice Sotomayor was persuaded that 
the district court had committed such a mistake. 
II. GLOSSIP’S QUADRUPLE DEFERENCE 
This Part examines Glossip’s four layers of deference. Section A 
argues that the Court failed to discuss important factors militating 
against the clear-error review it selected. It further contends that the 
Court applied this deferential standard of review too deferentially, 
heightening the plaintiffs’ burden beyond the law’s requirements. 
Section B then turns to the Court’s institutional deference to the 
Oklahoma DOC, arguing that the Court improperly ignored the State’s 
manifest lack of expertise, care, transparency, and oversight. Section C 
examines the Court’s creation of a highly deferential Eighth Amendment 
standard, arguing that this new doctrine is inconsistent with important 
language in key Eighth Amendment precedent. Finally, section D 
considers deference as spin, examining important facts that the Court 
ignored and other factually questionable or legally irrelevant points that 
the Court emphasized. 
A. Deference as Appellate Standard of Review 
1. Formal Problems: The Propriety of Clear-Error Review 
The majority concluded that the district court had not committed clear 
error in finding that midazolam “is highly likely to render a person 
unable to feel pain during an execution.”73 The majority emphasized this 
deferential standard of review at several turns, but the application of this 
standard was questionable. The inmate petitioners, for their part, 
contended that the question of midazolam’s pharmacological properties 
should be reviewed de novo.
74
 To be sure, appellate courts usually defer 
                                                     
71. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).  
72. Id. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948)).  
73. Id. at 2739.  
74. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 32. 
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to district court findings of fact, unless they are clearly wrong.
75
 And 
though the dissent disagreed with most of the majority’s factual and 
legal analyses, it did agree on the appropriateness of the clear error 
standard.
76
 That said, there are good reasons to think that the Court 
should have considered a more searching standard. 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis famously distinguished between 
“legislative facts,” on the one hand, and “adjudicative facts,” on the 
other.
77
 Adjudicative facts “deal with particular circumstances, relating 
the actions of the parties.”78 These factual questions typically deal with 
“what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background 
conditions were.”79 Trial courts typically answer these questions by 
following “procedures designed to ensure rigorous adversarial testing.”80 
By contrast, legislative facts “are general facts which help the tribunal 
decide questions of law and policy and discretion.”81 Legislative facts 
usually “transcend individual disputes and would likely recur in different 
cases involving similar subjects.”82 Contrary to their name, legislative 
facts need not be found by a legislature,
83
 though Congress often relies 
upon its own factual findings when it passes legislation.
84
 
Admittedly, the line between adjudicative and legislative facts can be 
blurry.
85
 The consequences of the distinction, however, are significant. 
Whereas the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that appellate 
                                                     
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 
(1982). 
76. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
77. See Davis, supra note 6, at 402–03.  
78. Dean Alfange, Jr., The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. 
REV. 637, 640 (1966). 
79. Davis, supra note 6, at 402. 
80. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1, 11 (2011).  
81. David L. Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in HOW LAW KNOWS 162 (Austin 
Sarat et al. eds., 2007) (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 160 
(3d ed. 1972)).  
82. See id.  
83. See KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 75 (2015) (“[C]alling 
these legislative facts is a terrible (but hopelessly entrenched) misnomer.”).  
84. Some commentators prefer other nomenclature. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate 
Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1185, 1233 (2013) (using 
the term “social facts”); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 
CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008). Because Professor Davis’s term “legislative fact” has been 
widely, though not universally, accepted, I follow his usage. 
85. See McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 84, at 75.  
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courts accept trial court findings of adjudicative facts that are not 
“clearly erroneous,”86 appellate courts often find legislative facts for 
themselves.
87
 
Neither the Glossip majority nor the dissent discussed the distinction 
between legislative and adjudicative facts. Both instead treated the key 
facts at issue as adjudicative, triggering clear-error review. Upon closer 
examination, however, it is far from obvious that the clearly erroneous 
standard should apply.
88
 Midazolam’s pharmacological properties are 
not unique to the Glossip litigation, or even to lethal injection litigation 
more generally. To the contrary, they always apply. Like other scientific 
facts, they are universally true. 
Our system assumes that trial courts are better situated than appellate 
courts to find facts,
89
 but trial courts’ systemic advantages are less 
obvious for scientific facts. Trial courts often credit or discredit 
witnesses based on their demeanor. The clear error standard exists, in 
part, because appellate judges do not enjoy this opportunity to assess 
witness credibility.
90
 
Scientific evidence, however, is less suited to credibility 
determinations.
91
 An expert’s witness-stand demeanor is often not a 
good reason to credit her science over a competing expert’s.92 Some 
witnesses may seem convincing but be scientifically mistaken.
93
 Others 
may seem awkward or nervous but be correct. Furthermore, the oral 
presentation of complicated scientific evidence can be confusing or 
misleading.
94
 Additionally, unlike many other kinds of factual testimony 
                                                     
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
87. See Borgmann, supra note 84, at 1188 (“Although nothing in [Rule 52(a)(6)] exempts social 
facts from its scope, it is widely believed that social facts are not subject to the rule and that 
appellate courts should review them independently.”); Alison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme 
Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1266 (2012). 
88. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168 n.3 (1986) (questioning whether the clear error 
standard should apply to social science “fact”).  
89. See Gorod, supra note 80, at 4–6. 
90. J. Jonas Anderson, Specialized Standards of Review, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 151, 159 
(2014). 
91. See Edward K. Cheng, Scientific Evidence as Foreign Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2010) (“scientific facts are rarely ever unique to the case at hand”). 
92. See, e.g., id.; John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 496 (1986) (contending that witness 
demeanor can be more distracting than helpful when empirical claims are at issue). 
93. See Cheng, supra note 91, at 1104 (“This ‘deference’ model of expert testimony is rife with 
danger, particularly since relying on traditional cues for assessing witness credibility is not 
necessarily a sound method for assessing scientific experts.”). 
94. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 92, at 496. 
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(e.g., did the witness see the defendant set fire to his barn?), much 
scientific testimony can be independently corroborated or undermined 
by published scientific studies. 
One would think, therefore, that the cogency of an expert’s 
explanation and the existence of reputable studies confirming or 
contradicting her opinion would be better measures of a scientific 
expert’s reliability than the district judge’s intuitions about that witness’s 
credibility. From this perspective, an appellate judge reviewing a 
transcript and scientific sources can make this judgment as accurately as 
the trial judge who heard the expert in person.
95
 Appellate judges may 
even be better situated to review scientific facts, because they usually 
have more time than trial judges to consider the scientific evidence 
carefully.
96
 
Even more importantly, the Court did not address reasons to think that 
the case presented not simply a factual question, but rather a mixed 
question of fact and constitutional law, which is usually freely 
reviewable.
97
 Glossip considered whether Oklahoma’s three-drug 
protocol created an unconstitutional risk of excruciating pain.
98
 The 
Court’s ruling affected not just Oklahoma but other states using or 
contemplating the same protocol. It is strange to think that a nationwide 
constitutional rule should hinge on a single district court’s possibly 
idiosyncratic factual findings,
99
 but that is essentially what the Court’s 
deferential approach would permit.
100
 
To this extent, even if the Court were generally correct to apply clear-
error review to scientific facts, its analysis ignored the question of how 
                                                     
95. See Hon. Michael E. Keasler & Cathy Cramer, Appellate Courts Must Conduct Independent 
Research of Daubert Issues to Discover “Junk Science”, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 361 (2011) 
(“[T]rial judges are in no better position than appellate judges to assess the validity of a scientific 
theory.”); David L. Faigman, The Supreme Court’s Confused Empirical Jurisprudence, 15 EXER 
303 (2015), http://www.jurilytics.com/downloads/bna/SupremeCourtConfusedJurisp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7KEZ-FG7W].  
96. See Keasler & Cramer, supra note 95, at 361–62. 
97. See 9C ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589, at 473 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
98. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589–90 (1935) (“That the question is one of fact does 
not relieve us of the duty to determine whether in truth a federal right has been denied.”).  
99. Cf. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 56–62 (2008) (distinguishing between reviewable facts and case-specific 
facts).  
100. Admittedly, a future district court rendering different factual findings could, in theory, hold 
the same protocol unconstitutional, but most district judges in practice would be unlikely to issue a 
ruling seemingly at odds with the Court’s Glossip ruling. See infra notes 442–444 and 
accompanying text. To this extent, Glossip essentially sends the signal that states adopting 
midazolam-based three-drug protocols like Oklahoma’s are constitutional.  
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appellate courts should treat constitutional facts, which will effectuate a 
nationwide constitutional rule, as opposed to narrower, case-specific 
facts, which only affect the litigation at hand.
101
 As the Court itself once 
explained, “Regarding certain largely factual questions in some areas of 
the law, the stakes—in terms of impact on future cases and future 
conduct—are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier 
of fact.”102 Accordingly, where a constitutional right is at stake, appellate 
courts typically apply more searching review to district court factual 
findings.
103
 For these collective reasons, the Court should have at least 
considered more searching review,
104
 especially given that the district 
court’s limited evidentiary hearing did not permit full development of 
the relevant facts anyway.
105
 
To be sure, there are also arguments in favor of applying the clearly 
erroneous standard here, though the majority did not rehearse them. For 
one, legislative facts often refer to common knowledge, not to more 
specialized scientific facts.
106
 To this extent, scientific facts do not fit 
comfortably within the realm of either legislative or adjudicative facts. 
Furthermore, if scientific facts were legislative facts, then appellate 
courts would have wide-ranging authority to do scientific research 
unaided by experts or the parties. Not only do most appellate judges lack 
the expertise to perform such inquiries well,
107
 but such freelancing 
might undermine our adversarial judicial system.
108
 Additionally, though 
                                                     
101. See FAIGMAN, supra note 99, at 62.  
102. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984). 
103. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Bose, 466 U.S. at 510–11; Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 189 (1964); Norris, 294 U.S. at 590; MILLER ET AL., supra note 97, § 2571, at 
227–32 (“[A] reviewing court may subject the factual findings of the trial court to a more searching 
review when First Amendment or other constitutional issues have been raised.”); id. § 2585, at 408 
(“[T]he reviewing court’s mandate is more complex and its examination of the evidence more 
extensive when constitutional issues are implicated.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 264 (“Bose insists that appellate courts must exercise independent 
judgment with respect to constitutional facts relevant to first amendment law application.”). 
104. Though the principle dissent agreed with the majority that clear-error review should apply, it 
did explain that “[e]specially when important constitutional rights are at stake, federal district courts 
must carefully evaluate the premises and evidence on which scientific conclusions are based, and 
appellate courts must ensure that the courts below have in fact carefully considered all the evidence 
presented.” Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2786 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
105. See infra Part II.A.2. 
106. See Gorod, supra note 80, at 39. 
107. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Einstein on the Bench?: Exposing What Judges Do Not Know 
About Science and Using Child Abuse Cases to Improve How Courts Evaluate Scientific Evidence, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 531, 533 (2003) (“[M]any judges, speaking candidly, consider themselves ill-
suited to the task of evaluating scientific evidence . . . .”).  
108. Cf. Gorod, supra note 80, at 53.  
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the Supreme Court has not consistently provided clear guidance on these 
issues, in other contexts, such as patent law, it has subjected scientific 
facts to clear-error review.
109
 Moreover, though lower courts will very 
likely follow the Supreme Court’s ruling on midazolam in future lethal 
injection cases, its decision technically does not bind lower courts in 
other cases, because it was tethered to the district court’s factual findings 
in this case.
110
 From this perspective, the argument that a constitutional 
fact was at issue is hardly a slamdunk. 
Significantly, though, Glossip did not engage with any of these issues, 
perhaps in part because the majority wanted lower courts to treat its 
decision as binding. Accordingly, the Court deferred to the district court 
without examining whether such deference was due, even though the 
petitioners had argued for a different standard.
111
 To this extent, even if 
justifiable, the Court’s application of the clear-error standard was badly 
under-theorized. 
2. Contextual Problems: The Truncated Evidentiary Hearing 
The Court also ignored issues unique to Glossip that militated for less 
deferential review. Appellate courts usually defer to trial court findings 
of adjudicative fact, but in Glossip, there was no trial. The district court, 
cognizant of the State’s interest in carrying out lawfully imposed 
sentences expeditiously, held only an abbreviated hearing on the 
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.112 These limited 
proceedings occurred less than three months after Oklahoma issued its 
midazolam-based protocol, despite the plaintiffs’ request for more time 
to find and prepare expert witnesses.
113
 Additionally, the court did not 
even permit the plaintiffs to offer evidence rebutting the State’s expert 
witness after he had testified.
114
 To this extent, the district court’s factual 
                                                     
109. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 831, 835–36 (2015) 
(citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)) (noting that Rule 52(a)(6) sets out a 
“clear command” and does not exclude certain categories of factual findings).  
110. See infra notes 442–44 and accompanying text. 
111. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 4, at 32–33. 
112. See Warner Ruling, supra note 66, at 4, (noting that the “compressed” schedule was 
“necessitated” by scheduled executions). The district court, in fact, initially hoped to avoid any 
hearing. See Transcript of Motion to Stay (Sept. 18, 2014), at 19–21, Warner v. Gross, No. 14-665 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014). 
113. See Transcript of Motion for Contempt (Nov. 13, 2014), at 81–84, Warner, No. 14-665 
(denying request for more time to prepare experts for expedited preliminary injunction hearing). 
114. See Warner Pretrial Conference, supra note 10, at 15; Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. 
Ct. 2726, 2792 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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findings about midazolam were based on an incomplete and hastily 
assembled record.
115
 
These hurried proceedings deprived not only the plaintiffs the 
opportunity to present their case fully but also the judge the chance to 
master the record. For example, after the botched Lockett execution, the 
Oklahoma Department of Public Safety (DPS) conducted dozens of 
interviews with persons connected with Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
procedure. The interview transcripts, amounting to over 3,000 pages, 
detail the adoption and implementation of the State’s lethal injection 
protocol.
116
 These interviews identified the manifest lack of 
professionalism underlying Oklahoma’s execution protocol and also 
made clear that the State selected midazolam without serious study of its 
properties.
117
 The plaintiffs, however, did not receive these documents 
until about a month before the evidentiary hearing, and the court did not 
admit them into the record until five days before its decision.
118
 The 
district judge did not reference these documents in his ruling and likely 
did not have time to consider them carefully or at all.
119
 
Even if clear-error review were otherwise appropriate, these 
procedural anomalies cast serious doubt on the propriety of that standard 
in this case.
120
 The scientific findings in Glossip were very different 
                                                     
115. The Court’s analysis accounted for these limited proceedings only insofar as it explained 
that the plaintiffs needed to satisfy the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. This 
analysis, too, proved to be deferential. Though the Court articulated the four traditional, 
preliminary-injunction factors—likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of 
equities, and the public interest—it did not weigh these factors collectively on a sliding scale. 
Rather, the Court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction solely because it determined 
(controversially) that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. See 
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736–38 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 
(2008)). To the extent the other factors (especially irreparable harm) may tip in the inmates’ favor, 
this less flexible approach to preliminary injunctions reflects yet another deferential determination 
in the State’s favor. See The Supreme Court – Leading Cases: Eighth Amendment – Death Penalty – 
Preliminary Injunctions – Glossip v. Gross, 129 HARV. L. REV. 271, 280 (2015).  
116. See infra note 118. 
117. See infra Part II.B.2.  
118. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 10. In a decision reminiscent of Yossarian’s 
idiosyncratic theory of censorship, the judge permitted the redaction of the transcript page numbers. 
See Order at 3–4, Warner, No. 14-665 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014); JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 16 
(1996). Consequently, my pin cites to DPS interviews refer to the PDF pagination of the relevant 
documents.  
119. See Warner Ruling, supra note 66, at 7–8 (praising the 29 page report summarizing the DPS 
findings, noting that a more complete report would have been several hundred pages, and implying 
that, given the circumstances, the DPS summary was sufficient). 
120. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 26 (2008) (refusing to defer to district 
court ruling on preliminary injunction where the district court’s consideration was “cursory”); cf. 
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining 
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from those in, say, patent cases,
121
 to which companies are usually 
willing and able to devote tremendous resources.
122
 Trial courts in patent 
cases are likely to have heard complete accounts of the facts from both 
sides. By contrast, the Glossip district court heard only a partial 
presentation of the facts. Clear-error review, even if otherwise 
applicable, is less appropriate under these circumstances.
123
 
3. The Court’s Questionable Factual Analyses 
a. Factual Findings About Midazolam 
The Glossip Court not only selected a contestable standard of review 
but also applied that deferential standard extremely deferentially. The 
Court extended great deference to the district court’s factual findings 
about midazolam, despite the fact that those findings rested almost 
entirely on the deeply flawed testimony of the state’s sole expert 
witness. In other words, even assuming the propriety of the clear-error 
standard in this case, the Court applied that standard questionably. 
The Court accepted the trial court’s finding that “midazolam is highly 
likely to render a person unable to feel pain during an execution.”124 This 
factual proposition was crucial to the Court’s holding that Oklahoma’s 
protocol was not “sure or very likely” to cause suffering.125 However, 
significant scientific literature suggests otherwise. Midazolam is not a 
barbiturate, but a benzodiazepine.
126
 A leading medical textbook 
explains that this class of drugs does “not cause a true general anesthesia 
because awareness usually persists . . . .”127 Midazolam’s primary 
                                                     
that judicial review of agency action asks whether the agency has thoroughly considered the 
problem); Berger, supra note 14, at 2069–70 (arguing that administrative law norms are relevant to 
constitutional decision-making). 
121. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (stating that practical 
considerations and precedent support application of the “clearly erroneous” standard). 
122. See Richard Finger, The Patent Millionaires: Striking it Rich with High Stakes Litigation, 
FORBES (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2012/10/22/the-patent-
millionaires-striking-it-rich-with-high-stakes-litigation/#2715e4857a0b363c88234d9b [https:// 
perma.cc/7BCH-52TT] (discussing the substantial resources dedicated to patent litigation). 
123. Indeed, the limited district court proceedings call into question the wisdom of the certiorari 
grant. Given the importance of the underlying factual questions, the Court should have waited to 
accept a similar case with more extensive district court proceedings and findings before issuing a 
decision with nationwide Eighth Amendment implications. 
124. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015).  
125. See id. at 2736 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008)); infra Part II.C.2. 
126. See LAURENCE L. BRUNTON ET AL., GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL 
BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 403 (11th ed. 2006). 
127. Id. at 404. 
04 - Berger.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:09 PM 
952 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:929 
 
clinical uses are to reduce anxiety, produce mild sedation, and relax 
muscles, often prior to the induction of anesthesia.
128
 Accordingly, much 
of the medical literature squarely addressing the issue states that 
“[m]idazolam cannot be used alone . . . to maintain adequate 
anesthesia.”129 To the contrary, as another leading textbook explains, 
midazolam, like other benzodiazepines, “must be used with other 
anesthetic drugs to provide sufficient analgesia . . . .”130 
In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 
district court had credited Dr. Evans’ testimony that midazolam could 
serve as a reliable anesthetic.
131
 However, as Justice Sotomayor 
explained, “Dr. Evans identified no scientific literature to support” this 
view.
132
 Instead, Dr. Evans relied on the website drugs.com,
133
 which 
another expert described as “out of date, incomplete, and of general low 
editorial quality.”134 It is highly questionable whether a website designed 
to provide basic information about medicine to a lay audience,
135
 rather 
than a medical journal or textbook, should be acceptable to corroborate a 
controversial point about a drug’s properties.136 In all events, even 
                                                     
128. See id. at 410–11; RONALD D. MILLER ET AL., MILLER’S ANESTHESIA 837, 841 (8th ed. 
2015) (“In the clinical practice of daily anesthesia, midazolam is often used immediately before 
induction of anesthesia.”); U. Khanderia & SK Pandit, Use of Midazolam Hydrochloride in 
Anesthesia, 6 CLIN. PHARM. 533, 533 (1987) (noting that midazolam’s primary use is as a pre-
operative sedative or pre-medicant); Brief of Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Neither Party at 11, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-7955) [hereinafter 
Pharmacologists’ Brief]. 
129. J. G. Reves et al., Midazolam: Pharmacology and Uses, 62 ANESTHESIOLOGY 310, 318 
(1985); see also Pharmacologists’ Brief, supra note 128, at 11 (“But while midazolam produces 
sleep and amnesia, with a short duration of activity, it cannot be used to render a person 
unconscious or to maintain general anesthesia.”). 
130. MILLER ET AL., supra note 128, at 842. 
131. See Warner Ruling, supra note 66, at 43 (finding that Dr. Evans “testified persuasively”); 
Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741 (citing Dr. Evans’ testimony). 
132. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
133. See Expert Report of Dr. R. Lee Evans (Dec. 2, 2014) at 6, Warner v. Gross, No. 14-665 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014).  
134. Post-Hearing Declaration by Larry D. Sasich (Jan. 8, 2015) at 2, Warner, No. 14-665; see 
also Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 336. 
135. See About Us, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/support/about.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4TLH-XJZ6] (describing mission statement as “to empower patients with the knowledge to better 
manage their own healthcare”). 
136. See Annie Waldman, Key Expert in Supreme Court Lethal Injection Case Did His Research 
on Drugs.com, PRO PUBLICA (Apr. 28, 2015, 12:31 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/key-
expert-in-supreme-court-lethal-injection-case-did-research-
drugs.com?utm_source=et&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dailynewsletter&utm_content=&
utm_name [https://perma.cc/7BCH-52TT] (quoting doctors criticizing Dr. Evans’ reliance on 
websites rather than “primary literature” for midazolam’s properties).  
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drugs.com cautioned that midazolam “should not be used alone for 
maintenance of anesthesia . . . .”137 The trial court, in other words, relied 
on an expert whose testimony was undermined by the very 
(questionable) source upon which he relied.
138
 
Dr. Evans justified his view that midazolam could maintain 
unconsciousness throughout an execution by explaining that higher 
doses of the drug, such as the 500 milligrams required by Oklahoma’s 
new protocol, will cause unconsciousness where a lower dose would 
not.
139
 The district court, however, heard extensive evidence about 
midazolam’s ceiling effect, above which an increase in dosage produces 
no discernible effect.
140
 While the plaintiffs’ experts admitted 
uncertainty about precisely how much midazolam meets the drug’s 
ceiling, they estimated that it was after about 40 or 50 milligrams—that 
is, ten times less than Oklahoma’s dose.141 Medical literature similarly 
indicates that increased doses of benzodiazepines like midazolam will 
not increase the drug’s pharmacological effects.142 Moreover, 
Oklahoma’s large dose is not given in any clinical setting, so Dr. Evans’ 
conclusions were based on conjecture rather than experience or scientific 
study.
143
 
The plaintiffs’ experts directly contradicted Dr. Evans’ testimony. 
These experts testified that midazolam at any dose cannot keep a person 
                                                     
137. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting record). 
138. To this extent, there is an argument that Dr. Evans’ testimony should not have been admitted 
at all, because it was not scientific valid. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
592–93 (1993). The district court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ Daubert motion. See Warner 
Ruling, supra note 66, at 34–40. 
139. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 639–40.  
140. See id. at 108–113, 127, 130–32, 137–39, 145, 342–46, 358 (testimony of Dr. Lubarsky and 
Dr. Sasich).  
141. See id. at 137 (testimony of Dr. Lubarsky); Expert Report of Dr. David A. Lubarksy (Nov. 
26, 2014) at 3, Warner v. Gross, No. 14-665 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter Lubarsky 
Report] (“Oklahoma’s 500 milligram dosage will not rapidly or reliably produce a deep level of 
anesthesia or coma, and further supports the existing published data that there is a ceiling effect with 
midazolam and that higher dose [sic] of the drug do not equate to a deeper level of 
unconsciousness.”).  
142. See GEORGE M. BRENNER & CRAIG W. STEVENS, PHARMACOLOGY 192 (2013) (explaining 
that whereas barbiturates’ anesthetic effect increases with dosage, benzodiazepines’ effect does not 
after a certain amount); Pharmacologists’ Brief, supra note 128, at 20 (“[T]he response to 
benzodiazepines cannot be further enhanced to unconsciousness and beyond by increasing the 
dose.”). 
143. See Waldman, supra note 136 (quoting Dr. Kelly Standifer, Chair of the Department of 
Pharmaceutical Sciences at the University of Oklahoma College of Pharmacy, as saying, “These 
kinds of doses [used by Oklahoma] are not given by any clinician. To say that they would know 
what this dose would do? I don’t think anyone can say that.”). 
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“insensate and immobile in the face of . . . noxious stimuli.”144 Unlike 
Dr. Evans, the plaintiffs’ experts did point to medical literature 
bolstering this conclusion.
145
 The Supreme Court, of course, credited the 
trial court’s finding that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam is “many 
times higher than a normal therapeutic dose.”146 However, that dosage 
increase is irrelevant if midazolam is incapable at any dose of rendering 
a person unconscious and insensate to pain, and most of the district court 
record on the topic indicated precisely that.
147
 
The majority responded to these concerns by invoking yet another 
layer of deference. It stressed that the plaintiffs bore the burden of 
establishing that midazolam even at very high doses cannot sufficiently 
anesthetize inmates.
148
 Specifically, the Court emphasized that the 
plaintiffs’ experts could not point to studies definitively corroborating 
their view that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam cannot induce 
unconsciousness and maintain anesthesia against excruciating stimuli.
149
 
Once again, the Court applied excessive deference. To be sure, civil 
rights plaintiffs usually do bear the burden of proof.
150
 “Burden” is a 
slippery term, but it typically means either that a party (usually the 
plaintiff) must present evidence supporting her claim to move forward 
with litigation, or that the fact-finder must break an evidentiary “tie” by 
ruling against the party bearing the burden (or both).
151
 The Court, 
however, used the term instead to heighten the plaintiffs’ evidentiary 
                                                     
144. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 126 (testimony of Dr. Lubarsky).  
145. See, e.g., Lubarsky Report, supra note 141, at 3–4 (citing medical journal studies about 
midazolam); Expert Report of Dr. Larry D. Sasich (Nov. 26, 2014) at 3–4, Warner, No. 14-665 
(same). 
146. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2742 (2015). 
147. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 106–07 (testimony of Dr. Lubarsky) (noting that 
midazolam is used “virtually never” to induce anesthesia “because it doesn’t work very well in that 
regard”); id. at 342–43 (testimony of Dr. Sasich) (explaining that midazolam has “no analgesic 
effect” and may even increase the perception of pain); id. at 587–88 (testimony of Dr. Katz) (noting 
that Clayton Lockett regained consciousness despite administration of 100 milligrams of 
midazolam); Lubarsky Report, supra note 141, at 2 (“Although midazolam can be used to induce 
anesthesia, it has no analgesic properties, and without the addition of pain-relieving drugs, does not 
render one insensate to noxious stimuli and is not suitable as a form of anesthesia as a single 
drug.”). 
148. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739. 
149. See id. 
150. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 (1998) (noting “the plaintiff’s burden of 
proving a constitutional violation”). 
151. See 21B KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122. For 
example, in a civil case where the plaintiff bears the burden and must prove her case by a propensity 
of the evidence, the fact-finder must rule in favor of the defendant where the weight of the evidence 
on each side is genuinely equal.  
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burden, requiring the plaintiffs to “prove their case beyond dispute.”152 
So phrased, the majority erects still another hurdle for the plaintiffs, 
requiring not only that the plaintiffs establish “an unacceptable risk of 
pain” under the Eighth Amendment, but that they establish that risk 
“beyond dispute.”153 The law does not support imposing this kind of 
heightened evidentiary burden on civil rights plaintiffs like the death row 
inmates here.
154
 
This move, once again highly deferential to the State, permitted the 
Court to explain away the plaintiffs’ powerful evidence about 
midazolam. The Court’s “burden” argument, indeed, makes it nearly 
impossible to challenge the suitability of an unsuitable drug. Because the 
consensus view is that midazolam, without the assistance of other drugs, 
cannot maintain anesthesia in humans against surgical-level stimuli, it 
would likely be unethical to design a study testing on humans whether it 
can in fact do so.
155
 But by faulting the plaintiffs’ experts for not 
pointing to such a study,
156
 the Court erected a nearly insurmountable 
wall of deference, effectively nullifying the Eighth Amendment right. If 
states can select drugs for purposes that cannot be ethically tested and if 
courts can discount plaintiffs’ experts for failing to identify a study 
definitively discrediting the states’ unusual use of a drug, the Eighth 
Amendment does almost nothing to protect against the states’ dangerous 
drug choices. 
In fairness to the majority, some medical literature does suggest that 
midazolam can produce unconsciousness.
157
 Such evidence provides 
                                                     
152. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741 (emphasis added). 
153. See id. In a separate questionable move, the Court also offered a very deferential articulation 
of the Eighth Amendment risk standard, see infra Part II.C, thus permitting it to pile deference upon 
deference.  
154. See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594 (“Neither the text of § 1983 or any other federal statute, 
nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear and convincing 
burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself.”). 
155. See Ethical Guidelines for Pain Research in Humans, INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, 
http://www.iasp-pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1213 [https://perma.cc/M2E7-
HPZW].  
156. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741 (“[P]etitioners’ own experts effectively conceded that they 
lacked evidence to prove their case beyond dispute.”). 
157. See, e.g., D. Al-Khudhairi et al., Haemodynamic Effects of Midazolam and Thiopentone 
During Induction of Anaesthesia for Coronary Artery Surgery, 54 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 831, 832–
33 (1982); Peter S. Glass et al., Bispectral Analysis Measures Sedation and Memory Effects of 
Propofol, Midazolam, Isoflurane, and Alfentanil in Healthy Volunteers, 86 ANESTHESIOLOGY 836, 
836 (1997); Z. Hussain Khan et al., The Dilemma of Hemodynamic Instability During Induction of 
Anesthesia: Can Midazolam Serve as a Suitable Substitute for Thiopentone?, 16 MED. J. ISLAMIC 
REP. OF IRAN 183, 186 (2003); J. G. Reves et al., Comparison Of Two Benzodiazepines For 
Anaesthesia Induction: Midazolam and Diazepam, 25 CAN. ANAESTHESIASTS’ SOC. J. 211, 213 
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some support for the Supreme Court’s factual conclusions. Most of these 
studies, however, define “unconsciousness” as the point where the 
subject stops responding to verbal commands and do not purport to 
study the crucial question of whether midazolam can maintain anesthesia 
against excruciating stimuli like surgery.
158
 One of these studies also 
included other potent drugs, so it did not measure whether midazolam on 
its own could maintain anesthesia against painful stimuli.
159
 
Nevertheless, these sources, if considered, presumably could provide 
some support for upholding the district court’s findings about 
midazolam, especially under the clear error standard. Significantly, 
though, the Supreme Court appears not to have considered (or known 
about) these studies.
160
 
To the contrary, the Court relied on its conclusion that the lower 
court’s acceptance of the State’s lone expert witness was not clearly 
erroneous.
161
 But beyond Dr. Evans’ poorly supported testimony, the 
evidence in the record and a neutral amicus brief in support of neither 
party
162
 pointed strongly to the opposite conclusion.
163
 The Court’s 
                                                     
(1978); Gordon M. Wyant & Lavern J. Studney, A Study of Diazepam (Valium®) for Induction of 
Anaesthesia, 17 CAN. ANAESTHESIASTS’ SOC. J. 166, 170 (1970).  
158. See, e.g., Glass et al., supra note 157, at 838 (describing stimuli on subjects as “moderate 
speaking voice,” “physical shaking,” or “trapezius squeeze”); Khan et al., supra note 157, at 184 
(studying the effects of midazolam when used in conjunction with other drugs including a paralytic 
and a potent opioid analgesic); J. G. Reves et al., supra note 157, at 211 (defining loss of 
consciousness as “loss of lid reflex and failure to respond to oral commands”) (emphasis in 
original); Wyant & Studney, supra note 157, at 166 (studying diazepam in procedures not involving 
surgical stimuli). 
159. See, e.g., Al-Khudhairi et al., supra note 157, at 831 (discussing other drugs patients 
received). 
160. Another study notes that midazolam is frequently used as an induction agent for intubation 
(the placement of a flexible plastic tube in the trachea to maintain an open airway). See, e.g., Mark 
J. Sagarin et al., Underdosing of Midazolam in Emergency Endotracheal Intubation, 10 ACAD. 
EMERG. MED. 329, 329 (2003). Intubation can actually be more stimulating than skin incision. See 
MILLER ET AL., supra note 128, at 1234. To this extent, this source would also lend some support to 
the Court’s conclusions. However, the Sagarin study included a neuromuscular blocker and 
concluded that “[b]ecause the patients appear unresponsive as a result of their complete 
neuromuscular blockade, many physicians do not appreciate that the patient may actually remain 
awake.” Sagarin et al., supra, at 335. Accordingly, this study does not convincingly support the use 
of midazolam to induce and maintain unconsciousness against surgical stimuli. Moreover, neither 
the district court nor the Supreme Court appears to have relied on or even known about this article, 
so it does not help justify the Court’s acceptance of the district court’s factual findings.  
161. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2741 (relying on Dr. Evans’ testimony). 
162. See Pharmacologists’ Brief, supra note 128, at 11 (contending that midazolam “cannot 
induce unconsciousness”). 
163. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Dr. Evans’ conclusions were 
entirely unsupported by any study or third-party source, contradicted by the extrinsic evidence 
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consideration of the evidence before it, then, suggests that it adopted a 
standard even more deferential than the clear-error standard it purported 
to apply. 
b. Factual Findings About the Availability of Other Drugs 
The majority also deferred to the district court’s finding that 
alternative methods of execution were not available to the Oklahoma 
DOC.
164
 The plaintiffs had suggested that Oklahoma use either sodium 
thiopental or pentobarbital instead of midazolam as its first drug. The 
Court discounted this proffer, crediting the lower court’s acceptance of 
Oklahoma’s assertion that it could not obtain either.165 Putting aside the 
legal question of whether the Eighth Amendment, properly understood, 
requires plaintiffs to proffer an alternative even when the challenged 
execution procedure causes excruciating pain,
166
 the Court was once 
again too quick to accept these findings. 
The Court was correct to review this factual finding for clear error. 
The availability of a particular drug is an adjudicative fact specific to the 
litigation. But the Court again applied the standard too deferentially. 
Even clear-error review requires some consideration of the underlying 
facts,
167
 and the Court provided virtually none. 
Justice Alito stated that “the record shows that Oklahoma has been 
unable to procure [sodium thiopental or pentobarbital] despite a good-
faith effort to do so.”168 Strikingly, however, the Court did not cite a 
specific source, event, or page of the record. It is therefore unclear what 
facts support this conclusion.
169
 
The Court’s unquestioning acceptance of Oklahoma’s story is 
especially troubling because the Court knew that Oklahoma had misled 
it on this point. In arguing that it had attempted and failed to obtain 
pentobarbital, the State’s brief cited a redacted letter claiming that the 
State’s source of pentobarbital had stopped providing the drug because 
                                                     
proffered by petitioners, inconsistent with the scientific understanding of midazolam’s properties, 
and apparently premised on basic logical errors.”). 
164. See id. at 2738.  
165. See id. 
166. See infra Part II.C.3. 
167. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). 
168. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738. 
169. The DOC Director did testify that his agency could not get pentobarbital or thiopental, but 
he did not elaborate. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 547–49 (testimony of Robert Patton). 
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of “intense pressure.”170 As it turned out, the letter in question was sent 
not to Oklahoma’s DOC, but Texas’s.171 The letter, therefore, does not 
bolster Oklahoma’s assertion that it could not get pentobarbital, 
especially given that the recipient of the letter, Texas, actually does 
continue to get that drug.
172
 
To this extent, Oklahoma’s claim that it could not get pentobarbital 
rested on misleading evidence. The petitioners explained this to the 
Court in its Reply Brief,
173
 and Oklahoma, to its credit, wrote a separate 
letter to the Court informing the Justices that the State “had 
inadvertently cited a letter as having been sent to the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections.”174 Nevertheless, the Court unquestioningly 
accepted Oklahoma’s initial assertion that it could not get the drug. 
Belying the Court’s conclusion is the fact that other states regularly 
execute inmates with pentobarbital. From the start of 2014 to mid-May 
2016, there have been sixty-one executions in the United States using 
pentobarbital.
175
 Texas and Missouri alone executed eighteen people 
using pentobarbital in 2015, and Texas executed six more people using 
that drug in just the first four months of 2016.
176
 
In fairness, it is plausible that Oklahoma is now unable to obtain 
pentobarbital from its old supplier. Many states are having difficulty 
procuring drugs for their protocols, and the Court was highly sensitive to 
                                                     
170. See Brief for Respondents at 11, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-7955); Chris McDaniel, 
Oklahoma’s Attorney General Misled Supreme Court About Letter On Execution Drug Availability, 
BUZZFEED (May 13, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/oklahomas-attorney-general-
misled-supreme-court-about-letter#.giYWPM40A0 [https://perma.cc/3TLZ-D8XE]. 
171. See McDaniel, supra note 170. 
172. See, e.g., Mark Berman, Texas Finds More Lethal Injection Drugs After All, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/03/25/texas-finds-
more-lethal-injection-drugs-after-all/ [https://perma.cc/HSU5-3J4G]. 
173. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-7955). 
174. Letter from Patrick R. Wyrick, Solicitor General of Oklahoma, to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, 
Supreme Court of the United States (May 13, 2015) (source on file with author). 
175. See Execution List 2016, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
execution-list-2016 [https://perma.cc/32ZH-AABB] ; Execution List 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2015 [https://perma.cc/KB46-QRZU]; 
Execution List 2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-
2014 [https://perma.cc/E9LH-WVLV]. 
176. See id.; Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing as “reasonable” 
the plaintiffs’ assumption that pentobarbital was “available” given that Texas and Missouri both 
continue to use it in executions); Manny Fernandez & John Schwartz, Confronted on Execution, 
Texas Proudly Says it Kills Efficiently, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/13/us/facing-challenge-to-execution-texas-calls-its-process-the-gold-standard.html 
[https://perma.cc/J872-XP6Z] (explaining that Texas’ one-drug protocol has posed far fewer 
problems than many states’ three-drug protocols). 
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this concern.
177
 Nevertheless, given that Oklahoma’s neighboring states 
still have access to pentobarbital for executions, the Court’s unstudied 
acceptance of the State’s story suggests that it was uninterested in facts 
that might complicate its narrative.
178
 Furthermore, given that states 
sometimes share execution drugs,
179
 the Court’s conclusion that 
Oklahoma could not get a drug other states consistently use was highly 
questionable. 
B. Deference as Institutional Analysis 
The Glossip majority also emphasized the institutional deference the 
judiciary owed the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC). The 
Court insisted that it had no business interfering with state lethal 
injection procedures, noting that “federal courts should not ‘embroil 
[themselves] in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their 
expertise.’”180 Lethal injection cases, the Court continued, “test the 
boundaries of the authority and competency of federal courts.”181 The 
Court, thus, indicated that federal courts are less well institutionally 
suited to judge lethal injection procedures than the agencies that design 
them. 
Glossip’s analysis on this count was both under-theorized and 
mistaken. Given that deference in these terms is essentially an 
institutional determination, one would think that the Court should couch 
such deference in comparative institutional analyses. The Court, 
however, offered virtually none. To be sure, courts have their own 
institutional limitations, which may largely explain the Court’s 
reluctance to interfere. But just because courts are not the ideal 
                                                     
177. See Ty Alper, Why the Execution Drug Shortage Won’t Go Away, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-oe-alper-lethal-injection-shortages-20150414-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/A32H-2SNC]; Manny Fernandez, Delays as Death-Penalty States Scramble for 
Execution Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/us/death-
penalty-lethal-injection.html [https://perma.cc/AE6H-5U6Y].  
178. See Corinna Lain, On Glossip, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 29, 2015), http://prawfsblawg. 
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/06/on-glossip.html [https://perma.cc/S34M-KGKG] (noting that 
pentobarbital was used in 15 of the last 17 executions “so someone’s getting it”).  
179. See, e.g., Gibson & Lain, supra note 41, at 1222; Texas Prison Officials Send Virginia 
Sought-After Drug for Execution This Week, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/09/27/us/texas-prison-officials-send-virginia-sought-after-drug-for-execution-this-
week.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5RLR-4R5U]. 
180. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2740 (2015) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
35, 51 (2008)).  
181. Id.; see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (warning that courts 
should not “substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution 
procedures”).  
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institutions to assess the safety of a lethal injection procedure does not 
mean that DOCs are actually better.
182
 
To the contrary, as both the plaintiffs and amici emphasized 
throughout the litigation, the Oklahoma DOC in particular and state 
departments of corrections more generally have made well-documented 
mistakes with their lethal injection protocols.
183
 While courts do not 
have intrinsic scientific expertise, they can hear from experts about drug 
choices and related issues. To the extent that the Oklahoma DOC did not 
consult experts,
184
 federal courts, for all their limitations, enjoy some 
advantages. An inexpert appellate court carefully reviewing scientific 
evidence may be preferable to an inexpert agency relying on no 
scientific evidence at all.
185
 
As I have argued elsewhere, courts considering whether an 
administrative agency deserves deference in individual rights cases 
should look to see how the agency has actually behaved.
186
 After all, if 
governmental action lacks democratic pedigree and professionalism, its 
legitimacy is seriously compromised. Of course, this inquiry is not 
decisive in an individual rights case.
187
 Courts hearing a lethal injection 
challenge, for instance, must apply the Eighth Amendment precedent to 
the execution procedure at issue. Institutional deference, then, usually 
operates as a lens through which the Court applies its substantive 
analysis. 
This section examines the propriety of Glossip’s institutional 
deference by considering the DOC’s democratic legitimacy, epistemic 
authority, and procedural regularity.
188
 This Article focuses on 
Oklahoma, but, where relevant, also notes other states’ practices, 
because those states’ mistakes further undermine the Court’s assumption 
that states can be trusted in this area. Moreover, to the extent that states 
often copy each other’s lethal injection practices and sometimes even 
                                                     
182. Cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 197 (1994) (criticizing institutional analysis that fails to compare 
the political branches with the judiciary). 
183. See, e.g., Complaint (June 25, 2014) at 14–18, Warner v. Gross, No. 14-665 (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 22 2014); State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 5–23. 
184. See infra Part II.B.2. 
185. Of course, this also raises questions about how courts review scientific evidence. See supra 
Part II.A. 
186. See Berger, supra note 14, at 2058–74. 
187. See id. at 2074–79. 
188. For a discussion of why these factors should help guide the deference determination, see 
generally id. at 2054–58. 
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hire each others’ officials,189 one state’s errors can help observers 
recognize problems that may arise elsewhere. 
1. Democratic Legitimacy 
Much anxiety over judicial review stems from the recognition that 
“judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force,” which allows unelected 
judges to override democratically enacted policy decisions.
190
 
Consequently, judicial deference to governmental actors in constitutional 
cases is often premised on the political branches’ ostensibly superior 
democratic accountability.
191
 But if public officials are not accountable, 
judicial deference on that rationale rests on shakier ground. To be sure, 
courts also lack democratic legitimacy, but if an administrative actor 
does too, then the judiciary’s relative democratic deficit is far more 
modest. Of course, judicial deference might still be appropriate on some 
other ground, but where an agency is largely unaccountable, courts 
should not premise deference on the agency’s political authority.192 
Glossip deferred to the DOC without examining its democratic 
legitimacy. This sub-section examines democratic legitimacy by 
considering legislative guidance, oversight, and transparency. Though 
not exhaustive, these factors shed substantial light on whether an agency 
has acted with democratic legitimacy worthy of judicial deference. 
a. Legislative Guidance 
Consideration of an agency’s democratic accountability starts with the 
issue of legislative guidance.
193
 After all, the unelected administrator 
takes her marching orders from the elected legislature, so the clarity and 
precision of the relevant statutes help determine the strength of the link 
between politically accountable officials and agency action.
194
 Indeed, 
the whole legitimacy of delegation is premised on the legislature 
                                                     
189. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1341. 
190. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16 (1962).  
191. See id. at 17–19 (“[T]he policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the 
electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system.”); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77–78 (1980). 
192. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 53, 59 (2008) (“[B]ureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values and . . . this goal is best 
advanced by giving decision-making authority to the most politically accountable officials . . . .”). 
193. See Berger, supra note 14, at 2061–63. 
194. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 369, 409 (1989) (characterizing modern legislation as instructions to administrative agencies).  
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delegating with a sufficiently “intelligible principle.”195 As Professor Ely 
argued, legislatures sometimes vaguely delegate matters to 
unaccountable lower-level officials precisely because they seek to 
escape “the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible 
functioning of a democratic republic.”196 
Policies resulting from such vague delegations should have 
presumptively less democratic pedigree. Whereas more precise 
delegation gives the agency some policy guidance from the legislature—
and, through it, “the people”—vague delegation essentially confers upon 
agencies a blank check. Such delegations heighten the democratic deficit 
of administrative agencies, rendering them less deserving of 
deference.
197
 
Lethal injection provides a case in point. While there is democratic 
support for capital punishment in some states, the particulars of 
execution procedures are usually beyond the contemplation of state 
legislators and the general public.
198
 Oklahoma statutes, for example, say 
nothing about midazolam.
199
 The legislature, then, had nothing to do 
with the drug selection. 
Of course, there is some democratic legitimacy here, given that the 
legislature has selected lethal injection as the method of execution. To 
this extent, this factor is somewhat equivocal. Moreover, the 
legislature’s delegation of the drug selection to the DOC seems 
reasonable, given the legislature’s own lack of expertise and the fast-
changing drug market. However, that said, the legislature of Oklahoma 
provided no guidance to bureaucrats selecting the drugs, so the resulting 
protocol cannot be said to have significant democratic authority, 
especially given the lack of oversight and transparency. 
                                                     
195. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).  
196. ELY, supra note 191, at 132.  
197. Cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–46 
(2000) (noting that despite agencies’ considerable power, they are not “directly accountable to the 
electorate.”).  
198. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 27, at 301–14 (discussing lethal injection political process 
failures); Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind 
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 
116–25 (2002) (discussing state delegation of lethal injection protocols). 
199. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1014 (2014) (“The punishment of death shall be carried out by the 
administration of a lethal quantity of a drug or drugs . . . .”).  
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b. Oversight 
Once legislatures have delegated authority to agencies, they can 
maintain some political accountability by proper oversight.
200
 Many 
governmental departments are large enough that officials far down the 
chain of command—and far removed from the chief executive’s political 
appointments—wield significant policymaking authority that can impact 
individual rights.
201 
As a result, political accountability hinges 
substantially on communication both within the agency and between the 
agency and politically accountable actors. In other words, agencies 
ideally should try to maintain a link both between the agency leader and 
elected officials and also among the various administrators operating at 
different levels of the administrative bureaucracy.
202
 
Elected officials in Oklahoma did maintain some connection to the 
redesigned lethal injection protocol, but it can hardly be deemed 
“oversight.” The Attorney General ostensibly oversaw a team of lawyers 
who designed the new protocol, but rather than encourage the team to 
review the options carefully, he only exhorted it to act quickly. One 
lawyer involved in the process explained that “we would get word from 
the Attorney General’s Office that we better hurry up and do 
something.”203 
Nor did other officials engage meaningfully in the process. Warden 
Anita Trammell, who admitted she was “responsible” for the execution 
protocol,
204
 conceded that she knew nothing about midazolam.
205
 
Though she admitted to signing the protocol, she played no role in 
designing it and did not even know who did.
206
 “I signed the damn 
thing,” Trammel said. “I did not write that policy. I did not choose those 
drugs.”207 
                                                     
200. See Berger, supra note 14, at 2063–65. 
201. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 130 (2d ed. 2002) 
(explaining that “the detailed understanding and actual implementation” of many agency programs 
occurs “at some remove from the political appointees”).  
202. Berger, supra note 14, at 2063.  
203. Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 289–90 (testimony of Michael Oakley, General 
Counsel, Oklahoma DOC).  
204. See id. at 90 (testimony of Anita Trammell, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary). 
205. See id. at 91. 
206. Id. at 90. 
207. Samantha Vicent, Oklahoma State Penitentiary Warden Retires as State Investigation into 
Executions Continues, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state/ 
oklahoma-state-penitentiary-warden-retires-as-state-investigation-into-executions/article_cab7f149-
91b3-56f9-a9f7-27a59b16482f.html [https://perma.cc/6AD8-WYRS].  
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An investigation similarly concluded that a different warden 
“carelessly assumed others would fulfill his own oversight 
responsibility. . . .”208 The Department of Corrections, the Governor’s 
office, and the Attorney General’s office all also failed on different 
occasions to review execution documents to avoid errors.
209
 Indeed, 
Oklahoma’s administrative hierarchy was so ill-defined that one news 
story concluded that “when it comes to Oklahoma’s executions, it’s 
unclear who is really running the show.”210 The result was chaos. This 
record hardly suggests substantial political oversight of the relevant 
administrative actors. Nevertheless, though the record contained ample 
evidence of the DOC’s disarray,211 the Court appears not to have 
considered it when it deferred to the State. 
c. Transparency 
The Court also failed to consider the DOC’s transparency. 
Governmental accountability is premised on popular monitoring of 
governmental activities; if the people cannot know what their 
government is doing, accountability is severely compromised.
212
 The 
risk of inadequate transparency is heightened in the agency setting, 
where officials are usually unelected and where the layers of 
bureaucracy and technical nature of the subject matter often shield a 
department’s affairs from public scrutiny.213 While this problem is 
probably impossible to eliminate, transparency allows the people and 
legislators to monitor agency action more carefully.
214
 
The Oklahoma protocol fares even worse under this metric. 
Oklahoma (like other states) quite literally conceals executions when 
things start to go wrong. When Clayton Lockett started convulsing on 
                                                     
208. See Interim Report No. 14 at 96, In the Matter of the Multicounty Grand Jury, No. GJ-2014-
1 (D. Ct. Okla., May 19, 2016) [hereinafter Oklahoma Interim Report]. 
209. See id. at 99. 
210. Cary Aspinwall et al., Records Raise Questions About Who Is in Charge of Oklahoma 
Executions, FRONTIER (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.readfrontier.com/investigation/records-raise-
questions-about-who-is-in-charge-of-oklahoma-executions/ [https://perma.cc/Z4LC-FEZD].  
211. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 116–17 (discussing DPS interviews).  
212. See ELY, supra note 191, at 125 (“[P]opular choice will mean relatively little if we don’t 
know what our representatives are up to.”); Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary 
Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108 
(2010) (“The essence of accountability lies in the transparency of government actions . . . .”). 
213. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in 
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 (2010); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and 
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1271 (2009). 
214. See Berger, supra note 14, at 2065–67. 
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the gurney, state officials closed the blinds to the execution chamber.
215
 
Agency policy can hardly be said to have democratic legitimacy when 
the government tries to conceal its mistakes. 
Oklahoma, like many states, also uses a paralytic in its lethal injection 
procedure to try to conceal any pain the inmate might feel. The paralytic 
makes it much harder to determine whether an inmate is dying an 
excruciating death, unless something goes horribly wrong.
216
 Oklahoma 
botched the Lockett execution so badly that the paralytic failed to take 
effect, but the paralytic likely conceals pain from public view during 
other executions.
217
 
States’ uses of blinds and paralytics are symptomatic of a broader 
lack of transparency in lethal injection. Many states design and 
implement their lethal injection procedures behind a veil of secrecy, 
which makes it extremely difficult for inmates to know how they will be 
executed. Most states release some facts, such as the drugs they plan to 
use, but many conceal other crucial details.
218
 Indeed, some states have 
passed lethal injection secrecy laws that deem execution procedures a 
state secret, sometimes explicitly exempting them from state Freedom of 
Information Act inquiries.
219
 Oklahoma’s statute, for instance, conceals 
not only the identities of persons who participate in executions or who 
supply “the drugs, medical supplies, or medical equipment” for 
execution procedures, but also exempts other important information 
from otherwise applicable state law.
220
 As a result, it is virtually 
impossible for inmates to know whether the state has safe drugs, proper 
equipment, and qualified personnel. 
                                                     
215. See Elliott Interview, supra note 56, at 9; Samantha Vicent & Barbara Hoberock, Emails 
from Gov. Fallin’s Office Show State Agencies’ Struggle to Respond to Scrutiny over Execution, 
TULSA WORLD (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/homepagelatest/emails-from-gov-fallin-
s-office-show-state-agencies-struggle/article_b059a1f2-03db-5618-bb33-fbe2f158f23a.html 
[https://perma.cc/DHK2-S984].  
216. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 678 (statement by state’s witness conceding that a 
conscious person “would not be able to move from the paralytic”); Berger, supra note 30, at 1374. 
217. See supra note 19 and infra notes 361–364 and accompanying text. 
218. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1391–92. 
219. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (West 2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:570 (2012); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1015(B) (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.2 (2013); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 40-20-206 (West 2014). 
220. See OKLA. STAT. § 22-17-1015(B) (2011) (“The identity of all persons who participate in or 
administer the execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical supplies or medical 
equipment for the execution shall be confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any civil or 
criminal proceedings.”).  
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This secret information bears directly on the safety of execution 
procedures.
221
 When states operate behind closed doors, it is much easier 
for them to cut corners and make mistakes. In the lethal injection setting, 
these mistakes can greatly heighten the risk of pain.
222
 Similarly, when 
states hide the credentials of their execution team members, they 
heighten the risk that states will employ under-qualified persons, who 
will make serious mistakes, such as those that resulted in the botched 
Lockett execution.
223
 Of course, Oklahoma did publish a report 
summarizing its mistakes,
224
 but it did so only after the media had 
exposed its mistakes anyway. 
To be clear, secrecy is sometimes legitimate. For example, states have 
a legitimate interest in concealing the identities of its execution team 
members. Oklahoma, however, also refuses to disclose their 
qualifications and training, crucial information for assessing the 
procedure’s safety. Some states, including Oklahoma, also explicitly 
give officials discretion to make last-minute changes to their protocols 
without giving condemned inmates notice of such deviations.
225
 As a 
result, states can substitute dangerous or illegal drugs at the last minute 
without providing any opportunity for either inmates or neutral chemical 
testers to verify the drugs’ quality and efficacy.226 In rushing to defer to 
the DOC, the Court did not examine these concerns at all. 
                                                     
221. See, e.g., Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he inability of the class 
of condemned prisoners to procure details about the execution process is troubling.”). 
222. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1432; Denno, supra note 35, at 1348. 
223. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1433; infra Part II.B.2.  
224. See OKLA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, THE EXECUTION OF CLAYTON D. LOCKETT (2014), 
http://www.dps.state.ok.us/Investigation/14-0189SI%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT2U-
8WYS] [hereinafter Lockett Execution Report]. This report was part of the district court record. See 
Exhibit and Witness List, Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 14-665), 2014 
WL 7671680. 
225. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2011) (Delaware); Beaty v. 
Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (D. Ariz. 2011) (Arizona); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1337–
38 (10th Cir. 2010) (Oklahoma); ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., DEPARTMENT ORDER 710, 1 (2015), 
https://corrections.az.gov/sites/default/files/policies/700/0710_-_effective_10-23-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S45P-R6JH ] (giving discretion to DOC Director to deviate from written execution 
protocol); OKLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION PROCEDURES 2 (2015), https://www.ok.gov/ 
doc/documents/op040301.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2F3-ZV6N] (giving discretion to DOC Director to 
deviate from written execution protocol).  
226. See First Amended Complaint at 31–35, Wood v. Ryan, No. CV-14-1447-PHX-NVW J, 
2014 WL 3385115, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 10, 2014) (“Although witnesses did not know that 
Defendants secretly were improvising with the amounts of drugs they were giving to Wood, it 
became clear to everyone that something was wrong.”). 
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2. Expertise 
Whereas agencies’ political authority is often weak, their epistemic 
authority is ostensibly strong. Administrative agencies exist in large part 
to bring specialized expertise to complicated problems.
227
 Accordingly, 
deference to agency action often rests substantially on the agency’s 
presumptive expertise.
228
 
In practice, however, agencies like the Oklahoma DOC do not always 
possess actual expertise over subjects they administer. Correctional 
officials may have expertise in prison security, but they rarely have the 
kind of medical training helpful for designing and implementing safe 
lethal injection procedures.
229
 Cognizant of this shortcoming, officials 
often delegate lethal injection protocols down the chain of command to 
other prison personnel, but those people also lack such training.
230
 While 
many states incorporate medical personnel at some stage in the 
procedure, the actual protocols are often designed by administrative 
officials who demonstrate little understanding of the drugs’ risks.231 
Many states are remarkably unconcerned with their own epistemic 
shortcomings. Historically, most states adopted lethal injection 
procedures by copying Oklahoma’s 1977 three-drug protocol without 
actually studying it.
232
 For several decades, many states did not require 
the execution teams to include trained personnel, even though the 
protocol created serious risks if implemented inexpertly.
233
 Years later, 
the Oklahoma medical examiner who initially designed the protocol 
explained, “it never occurred to me when we set this up that we’d have 
complete idiots administering the drugs.”234 
This inexpert approach continues today in several states, including 
Oklahoma. When Oklahoma realized that it did not have enough 
pentobarbital to proceed with executions, it sought a solution so that it 
could restart executions. However, instead of turning to doctors or 
                                                     
227. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8–29 (1985) 
(explaining that much impetus for the creation of administrative agencies is desire for expert rather 
than lay or political judgment). 
228. See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2008).  
229. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 15, at 64–65. 
230. See Berger, supra note 27, at 330.  
231. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1360–76. 
232. See Denno, supra note 25, at 64–117. 
233. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 198, at 90–120. 
234.  Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2007) (quoting E-mail from A. 
Jay Chapman, Forensic Pathologist, Santa Rosa, Cal., to Deborah W. Denno, Professor of Law, 
Fordham Law Sch. (Jan. 18, 2006)). 
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scientists, the State delegated the task to a team of lawyers,
235
 who tried 
in vain to find “phenobarbital.”236 
This team faced substantial political pressure “to make the decision, 
get it done, hurry up about it.”237 After just four days, the State adopted a 
new execution protocol including midazolam.
238
 It is quite clear that the 
lawyers involved did not understand midazolam’s shortcomings. One 
team member testified that “we knew midazolam had the same 
properties as pentobarbital. . . .”239 This understanding is plainly wrong, 
as midazolam lacks analgesic properties and, unlike pentobarbital, is not 
a barbiturate.
240
 
Nor did the team of lawyers consult reputable sources about the 
drug.
241
 A former General Counsel for the Oklahoma DOC explained 
that he had done his own independent research, including looking 
“online. . . . past the key Wiki leaks, Wiki leaks or whatever it is. . . .”242 
Though it is difficult to discern exactly what these lawyers consulted, it 
seems clear that they did not consult medical textbooks, journals, or 
professionals. A multicounty grand jury ultimately concluded that the 
new protocol was “vague and poorly drafted” and lacked several 
important safeguards.
243
 
                                                     
235. See Patton Interview, supra note 56, at 56. 
236. See Interview by Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Mike Oakley, Former Gen. Couns., Okla. 
Dep’t of Corr., in Okla. City, Okla., Transcript at 7, (June 10, 2014) [hereinafter Oakley Interview] 
(noting that “Phenobarbital is the first drug in the protocol” and that it was “going to be very 
difficult to locate”) (emphasis added). Phenobarbital, a slow-acting barbiturate, is used commonly to 
treat certain kinds of seizures. See, e.g., Deb K. Pal, Phenobarbital for Childhood Epilepsy: 
Systematic Review, 7 PAEDRIATRIC PERINATAL DRUG THERAPY 31, 31 (2006). It appears that 
Oakley mistakenly called “pentobarbital” by the wrong name, though it is possible Oklahoma 
officials considered substituting “phenobarbital” in their protocol. See Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law at 4 n.4, Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 
14-665), 2014 WL 7671680 [hereinafter Proposed Findings of Facts]. 
237. See Oakley Interview, supra note 236, at 19 (referencing the “pressure” to “get it done”); 
Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 289–90 (testimony of Mike Oakley) (acknowledging “political 
pressure” to “get it done and get it in place”); Aspinwall, supra note 210. 
238. See State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 7; Eric Berger, The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 731, 739 (2015); Associated Press, State Prepares to Resume Executions, but 
Questions Linger, MUSKOGEE PHOENIX (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.muskogeephoenix.com/news/ 
oklahoma_news/article_e26c0b36-4c4c-11e4-8666-17ea756064ce.html [https://perma.cc/X5PY-
6AY7]. 
239. Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 287 (testimony of Mike Oakley). 
240. See supra Part II.A.3.a.  
241. See Stern, supra note 19.  
242. State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 10 (quoting record). 
243. See Oklahoma Interim Report, supra note 208, at 77–93. 
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Expertise problems also extended to the procedure’s administration, 
thereby further heightening the risk that the State’s selected drugs would 
inflict excruciating pain. Oklahoma officials, indeed, admitted that there 
had been “an atmosphere of apprehension” before the Lockett execution, 
because they realized that execution-team training had been 
inadequate.
244
 Though the protocol included a doctor and paramedic, 
neither had attended training sessions.
245
 Consequently, they did not 
have practice interacting with the team, and the other team members 
never received the benefit of their professional expertise.
246
 A warden 
later explained that “everyone knew their specific job, but they didn’t 
know anybody else’s job, so if I had an employee leave, we didn’t know 
what that person did.”247 The execution team also lacked basic but 
crucial information, such as how quickly the midazolam would take 
effect.
248
 Nor did it have “training protocols or contingency plans on 
how to proceed with an execution if complications occur during the 
process.”249 
This lack of expertise caused Lockett’s botched execution. The doctor 
failed to set the catheter properly, even though Lockett’s veins were 
“good” for IV access.250 Compounding that mistake, this same physician 
mistakenly judged Lockett to be fully anesthetized and permitted the 
injection of the second and third drugs, only for Lockett to awaken and 
suffer agonizing pain.
251
 While it may seem encouraging that Oklahoma 
employed a doctor for its procedure, doctors without training in 
anesthesiology lack the expertise to monitor someone’s anesthetic depth 
                                                     
244. See Interview by Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Paramedic, in Okla. City, Okla., Second 
Interview, Transcript at 22 (July 31, 2014). 
245. See Interview by Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Paramedic, in Okla. City, Okla., First 
Interview, Transcript at 6 (May 23, 2014) [hereinafter Paramedic First Interview]; Interview by 
Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Physician, in Okla. City, Okla., Transcript at 12 (May 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter Physician Interview]. 
246. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 20–22.  
247. Oklahoma Interim Report, supra note 208, at 62. 
248. See Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Prisons Director Who Presided Over Botched Executions 
Announces Resignation, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/ 
2015/12/04/oklahoma-prisons-boss-resigns-amid-execution-investigation [https://perma.cc/9Q8U-
WYX7]; Interview by Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Anita Trammell, Warden, Okla. State 
Penitentiary, in Okla. City, Okla., Transcript at 97 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter Trammell Interview] 
(“with this new drug [midazolam] and not knowing if there was enough left or if there was enough 
in his system. You know it just didn’t know—just didn’t know what to do on it.”).  
249. Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 22. 
250. See id. at 16; Expert Report of Dr. Eric D. Katz (Nov. 26, 2014), at 3, Warner v. Gross, 776 
F.3d 721 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 14-665), 2014 WL 7671680.  
251. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 11.  
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accurately.
252
 Similarly, a doctor who has not set a catheter recently may 
not be able to do so properly. In fact, the participating physician later 
said, that he “wasn’t wanting to do the IV access in the first place.”253 
Oklahoma’s next execution of Charles Warner was also problematic. 
Warner’s last words were, “My body is on fire.”254 The State later 
admitted that it had injected Warner with the wrong third drug.
255
 
Oklahoma, however, learned slowly from this mistake, as it 
subsequently suspended its next scheduled execution of Richard Glossip 
when doctors discovered at the last minute that the State had again 
obtained the wrong drug.
256
 This mistake, on its own, likely does not 
increase the risk of serious pain; after all, the correct third drug already 
causes excruciating pain. Nevertheless, the litany of errors hardly 
suggests that the State had expertise worthy of deference. As one 
reporter editorialized, “[t]he head of Oklahoma’s Department of 
Corrections has overseen three scheduled executions during his brief 
time in Oklahoma. Each time, there was a major screw-up.”257 
Other states’ track records are no more encouraging.258 When 
Missouri still used the three-drug protocol, it instructed its executioners 
to inject the drugs as quickly as possible, mistakenly believing that its 
first drug, thiopental, renders a person fully unconscious within fifteen 
seconds. In reality it takes two-and-a-half minutes.
259
 Missouri also 
entrusted its procedure to a dyslexic doctor, who later admitted he had 
                                                     
252. See Taylor Trial Transcript at 71, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (June 26, 2006) 2006 
WL 1779035 (testimony of expert anesthesiologist). 
253. Physician Interview, supra note 245, at 56. 
254. See Buncombe, supra note 60.  
255. See Mahita Gajanan, Oklahoma Used Wrong Drug in Charles Warner’s Execution, Autopsy 
Report Says, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/08/ 
oklahoma-wrong-drug-execution-charles-warner [https://perma.cc/X2J7-KTV9] (explaining that 
Oklahoma injected potassium acetate instead of potassium chloride).  
256. See Chris McDaniel, Execution Mistakes Followed Corrections Director from Arizona to 
Oklahoma, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/execution-
mistakes-followed-corrections-director-from-arizon#.nodRW3G9w [https://perma.cc/T7GE-ULTE].  
257. See id. 
258. See, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (“[T[he [California] team 
members almost uniformly have no knowledge of the nature or properties of the drugs that are used 
or the risks or potential problems associated with the procedure.”). 
259. Deposition of Larry Crawford at 129–31, Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D. Mo. 
June 26, 2006) rev’d 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4173) (containing explanation by DOC 
Director that drugs are injected in rapid succession); Berger, supra note 30, at 1437.  
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been unable to calculate how much anesthetic he had prepared for 
executions.
260
 
Some states also have demonstrated that they do not know or care 
enough to find legal and safe drugs. For example, Missouri purchased 
and used drugs from an Oklahoma compounding pharmacy that 
subsequently admitted to 1,892 violations of state pharmacy 
regulations.
261
 Though Missouri capital inmates had objected that the 
pharmacy’s facilities were not FDA-approved and created a substantial 
risk that the pentobarbital compounded there would be of unreliable 
“sterility, identity, purity, potency, and efficacy,”262 the State pressed on 
with executions. When the initial Oklahoma pharmacy finally agreed not 
to provide drugs for future executions, it appears that Missouri simply 
found another under-regulated compounding pharmacy.
263
 Rather than 
make an effort to find safe drugs, the Missouri focused instead on trying 
to keep its drug choices secret.
264
 
States have also looked for questionable drugs abroad. Nebraska 
repeatedly tried to purchase sodium thiopental from Chris Harris, an 
American salesman in India without a pharmaceutical background.
265
 
Nebraska paid over $54,000 to Harris for drugs without ever 
investigating his qualifications or the legality of importing those 
drugs.
266
 A reporter subsequently discovered that Harris’ ostensible 
manufacturing facility was an empty apartment near Calcutta from 
which Harris had moved away two years earlier.
267
 Given these 
                                                     
260. See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035 at *7; Dr. John Doe Deposition at 20–25, Taylor, 2006 WL 
1779035. 
261. See Chris McDaniel, Pharmacy That Mixed Executions Drugs Is Being Sold After Admitting 
Numerous Violations, BUZZFEED NEWS (April 21, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/ 
pharmacy-that-mixed-execution-drugs-is-being-sold-after-disc?utm_term= 
.llwQLER87#.kdqwvZdjz [https://perma.cc/5FZP-VM89].  
262. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Complaint at 2, Taylor v. Apothecary Shoppe, No. 14-CV-063-TCK-
TLW (N.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2014).  
263. See Berger, supra note 30, at 1369–70. 
264. See id. at 1369–71. 
265. See Chris McDaniel, This is the Man in India Who Is Selling States Illegally Imported 
Execution Drugs, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/ 
this-is-the-man-in-india-who-is-selling-states-illegally-imp#.pbkLb8nky [https://perma.cc/HS33-
4G2W].  
266. See Bruce Einhorn & Matt Stroud, Questions Surround Supply of Nebraska’s Lethal 
Injection Drugs, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 27, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-05-27/questions-surround-supply-of-nebraska-s-lethal-injection-drugs [https://perma. 
cc/B8X4-VMMT] (listing issues Nebraska failed to investigate before paying over $54,000 for 
drugs it could not legally import); McDaniel, supra note 261. 
267. See McDaniel, supra note 261. 
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circumstances, it seems doubtful that Harris had access to 
uncontaminated, safe thiopental, but, even if he did, federal law clearly 
prohibits its importation anyway.
268
 At least three other states made 
similar mistakes, paying Harris for drugs they could not legally 
import.
269
 
Other states also have had difficulties employing qualified people to 
set the catheter and equip the execution chamber.
270
 When Florida 
execution team members misplaced Angel Diaz’s IV line, the drugs 
spilled into the surrounding tissue, causing excruciating pain.
271
 During 
the botched execution of Joseph Wood, Arizona injected fifteen times 
the standard dose of its drug.
272
 As one professor of anesthesiology 
remarked afterwards, “[t]hey’re making this up as they go along.”273 
States’ failure to acknowledge their mistakes only deepens these 
concerns further. After Wood’s two-hour execution, Arizona denied that 
the execution had been botched.
274
 State officials refused to answer a 
reporter’s question, “How is a two-hour execution not botched?”275 After 
Lockett’s gruesome execution, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin 
implausibly claimed that Lockett had remained unconscious throughout 
the whole procedure.
276
 Indeed, rather than concede the obvious 
problems, Oklahoma officials threatened to impeach Oklahoma Supreme 
                                                     
268. See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
269. See McDaniel, supra note 261. 
270. See, e.g., Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting Arizona’s 
numerous problems with setting the IV line).  
271. See FLA. GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON ADMIN. OF LETHAL INJECTION, FINAL REPORT WITH 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2007) (finding “[f]ailure of the training of the [Florida] 
execution team members.”). 
272. See Fernanda Santos, Executed Arizona Inmate Got Fifteen Times Standard Dose, Lawyers 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/executed-arizona-man-
given-15-times-standard-dose-lawyers-say.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H7UK-9FHC].  
273. See id. (quoting Dr. Joel Zivot, Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology and Surgery at Emory 
University Hospital).  
274. See Arizona Prison Chief Says Execution Wasn’t Botched, KSN.COM (July 24, 2014), 
http://ksn.com/2014/07/24/arizona-prison-chief-says-execution-wasnt-botched/ 
[https://perma.cc/XW6G-XEYC].  
275. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Politics of Botched Executions, 49 RICH. L. REV. 825, 837 
(2015). 
276. See Greg Botelho & Dana Ford, Oklahoma Stops Execution After Botching Drug Delivery; 
Inmate Dies, CNN (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/29/us/oklahoma-botched-
execution/ [https://perma.cc/8YTL-NB9M].  
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Court justices who voted to stay an execution so that the court could 
examine a challenged execution procedure.
277
 
When governmental officials do not recognize or admit serious 
mistakes, deference to them on account of their epistemic authority is 
deeply misplaced. In his Baze concurrence, Justice Stevens made a 
related argument, observing that states designing and implementing 
lethal injection procedures usually operate “with no specialized medical 
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guidance.”278 
Consequently, contended Justice Stevens, DOC officials’ choices “are 
not entitled to the kind of deference afforded legislative decisions.”279 
The Glossip majority, by sharp contrast, turned a blind eye to these 
concerns. The record in Glossip was replete with examples of 
Oklahoma’s incompetence,280 and yet the Court proceeded as though the 
State possessed genuine expertise deserving of deference. 
3. Procedural Regularity 
A final consideration relevant to institutional deference involves 
agency procedures.
281
 When agencies do not follow established 
procedures, they are more likely to engage in arbitrary behavior 
undeserving of deference.
282
 Once again, Oklahoma’s lethal injection 
protocol does not fare well under this measure. 
As noted above, Oklahoma’s procedures for selecting the drug 
midazolam were haphazard.
283
 Its procedures for injecting the drugs 
were no better. In at least one case, Oklahoma failed to follow its own 
execution protocol and injected the wrong drug.
284
 Subsequent 
                                                     
277. See Andrew Cohen, Oklahoma Just Neutered Its State Supreme Court, THE WEEK (Apr. 29, 
2014), http://theweek.com/article/index/260632/oklahoma-just-neutered-its-state-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/9LPH-58WB]. 
278. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
279. Id.  
280. See generally State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 5–23 (detailing Oklahoma’s lack of expertise 
and careful processes in adopting midazolam); see supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. Of 
course, there may well be competent, well-intentioned people involved in Oklahoma’s lethal 
injection protocol, but numerous factors often make it difficult for state officials to design workable 
execution procedures. See Berger, supra note 238, at 741–58. 
281. Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
282. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1680 (1975) (discussing checks on agencies that “promote formal justice in order to 
protect private autonomy”).  
283. See supra notes 235–243 and accompanying text.  
284. See Matt Ford, An Oklahoma Execution Done Wrong, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/an-oklahoma-execution-done-wrong/409762/ 
[https://perma.cc/JTM8-X7Z8]. Admittedly, Oklahoma’s use of the wrong drug did not become 
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investigation demonstrated that the State had lacked the kind of careful 
administrative procedures necessary to prevent such a mistake.
285
 
Additionally, during the Lockett execution, the State deviated from its 
own protocol in several ways.
286
 For example, one paramedic execution 
team member admitted that his syringe contained a smaller amount of 
the second and third drugs than it had had for previous executions.
287
 
This team member speculated that the State’s unusual decision to 
attempt two executions in the same evening likely contributed to this 
confusion.
288
 
Similarly, the State did not have the proper equipment available, so 
the warden had to borrow needles and syringes at the last minute “from 
our medical.”289 As a result, the doctor did not have the proper needle for 
the femoral catheter insertion he attempted and also lacked other 
equipment to do the job correctly.
290
 These equipment problems surely 
contributed to the doctor’s mistakes.291 To make matters worse, the 
execution team members did not mention the various problems to each 
other or their superiors “until after everything went — gone wrong.”292 
State officials also did not know what procedures applied when 
problems arose. As Lockett’s execution became increasingly gruesome, 
state officials decided to stop it, but they did not know what procedures 
to use to halt the execution.
293
 In the meantime, Lockett died.
294
 
Indeed, Oklahoma execution team officials often departed from 
written procedures. During some Oklahoma executions, the Director of 
the DOC modified the execution protocol without authority to do so.
295
 
The procedural anomalies were so egregious that the Oklahoma 
Attorney General, to his credit, ultimately acknowledged that “a number 
                                                     
public until after the Court had decided Glossip, but the Lockett botch and other errors had already 
come to light, and the Court paid them little attention. 
285. See Oklahoma Interim Report, supra note 208, at 33–37. 
286. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 14.  
287. See Paramedic First Interview, supra note 245, at 15 (admitting that the amounts of some 
drugs in the syringes were less for one execution than they had been for others). 
288. See id. (“[W]e didn’t know what the game plan was . . . .”). 
289. See Trammell Interview, supra note 248 at 95. 
290. See Physician Interview, supra note 245, at 7 (“The only thing they had was a, was a short 1 
¼” needle which is pretty, kind of marginal.”); Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 16. 
291. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 16. 
292. Paramedic First Interview, supra note 245, at 17. 
293. See Interview by Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety with Steve Mullins, General Counsel to 
Governor, in Okla. City, OK at 19, (May 15, 2014).  
294. See id. at 21.  
295. See Oklahoma Interim Report, supra note 208, at 1–2. 
04 - Berger.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:09 PM 
2016] GROSS ERROR 975 
 
of individuals responsible for carrying out the execution process were 
careless, cavalier and in some circumstances dismissive of established 
procedures that were intended to guard against the very mistakes that 
occurred.”296 
Other lethal injection states have also historically had difficulty 
following their own written lethal injection protocols.
297
 Missouri, for 
example, has permitted haphazard deviations from its protocol,
298
 
sometimes injecting less anesthetic than its protocol required.
299
 A 
federal judge concluded that California’s protocol had suffered, inter 
alia, from inconsistent screening of execution team members, inadequate 
training, and inconsistent record keeping.
300
 Arizona, too, permitted 
several deviations from state law and internal procedures. For instance, 
its execution team members lacked the qualifications required by the 
state protocol.
301
 
Time and again Oklahoma and other lethal injection states have 
demonstrated that they do not consistently follow the rules that should 
bind them, as though ordinary procedures do not apply when states 
implement the death penalty. States also commonly follow each other’s 
practices and even hire each other’s officials, so one state’s practices can 
be quite probative of another’s. Indeed, the official responsible for 
Arizona’s deviations from its protocol subsequently took over 
Oklahoma’s procedure. Once there, he made similar mistakes and 
                                                     
296. Press Release from Okla. Attorney Gen. Scott Pruitt (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.ok.gov/triton/modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=258&article_id=21802 
[https://perma.cc/T2F3-ZV6N]. In fairness, the Court in Glossip did not have the benefit of this 
admission or the related May 19, 2016 Interim Report. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs still presented 
substantial evidence of Oklahoma’s unprofessional approach to lethal injection throughout the 
litigation, and yet the Court ignored it. See, e.g., Proposed Findings of Facts, supra note 236, at 1–
50; State AG Brief, supra note 49, at 5–23; Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 14–19, 
20–25; Oakley Interview, supra note 236; Trammell Interview, supra note 248. To this extent, the 
Multicounty Grand Jury’s findings merely corroborated arguments the plaintiffs had already made 
based on available evidence.  
297. See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d. Cir. 2010) (acknowledging Delaware’s 
“noncompliance” with its own protocol). 
298. See Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006) (“[One 
defendant] also testified that he felt that he had the authority to change or modify the formula as he 
saw fit. It is apparent that he has changed and modified the protocol on several occasions in the 
past.”). 
299. See id. 
300. See Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979–80 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
301. See West v. Brewer, 2011 WL 6724628, at *6 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2011) (“ADC Director 
Charles Ryan has admitted that he conducted the last five executions with full knowledge that at 
least one of the Medical Team members did not hold a medical license and did not administer IVs in 
his current employment.”); McDaniel, supra note 256. 
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presided over two botched executions and a third that was called off 
because the State had purchased the wrong drug.
302
 
Just like the lack of expertise, these procedural shortcomings 
substantially heighten the risk that lethal injection procedures will cause 
excruciating pain. Even if midazolam were a suitable anesthetic, 
Oklahoma’s protocol would raise serious constitutional concerns, 
because the State implements the protocol too haphazardly to protect 
against agonizing deaths. Had the Court grappled with these serious 
procedural shortcomings, it would have been much harder to justify the 
deference that pervaded the entire opinion. 
 * * * 
In short, Oklahoma’s DOC developed lethal injection protocols 
haphazardly. It acted with modest legislative guidance, minimal 
oversight, and even less transparency, expertise, and procedural 
regularity. Collectively, these factors should cut against deference. 
To be clear, the point is not that the Court should have applied the 
exact institutional analysis offered here. Nor is it that these factors 
should be legally decisive. Rather, the point is that lethal injection states, 
especially Oklahoma, have demonstrated that they do not deserve courts’ 
benefit of the doubt. The Court, however, ignored this record of 
alarming incompetence and instead offered great deference on the theory 
that courts should not interfere with the states in these kinds of 
matters.
303
 
C. Deference as Doctrine 
The Court also reformulated the Eighth Amendment test for method-
of-execution cases to offer significantly more deference to states than 
earlier formulations had. Unlike the last two forms of deference, this one 
is built into the doctrine itself. Just as the rational basis test in equal 
protection (and other) cases approaches governmental action 
deferentially, so too does Glossip’s articulation of the Eighth 
Amendment standard. This subsection begins by summarizing the 
relevant precedent. It then turns to Glossip’s articulation of the Eighth 
Amendment risk standard and the requirement that plaintiffs proffer an 
available alternative. 
                                                     
302. See McDaniel, supra note 256; Murphy, supra note 248. 
303. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2740 (2015); supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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1. Method-of-Execution Precedent 
Method-of-execution cases comprise only a small subset of Supreme 
Court Eighth Amendment decisions, and the precedent does not fully 
answer questions that arise in lethal injection cases today. In part 
because the Court did not incorporate the Eighth Amendment to apply 
against the states until 1962,
304
 the early cases provide only marginally 
helpful dicta. For example, though In re Kemmler examined New York’s 
electrocution procedure, it held that the Eighth Amendment did not 
apply to the states and therefore rejected the challenge.
305
 For that 
reason, its precedential value for contemporary lethal injection cases is 
limited.
306
 Similarly, though courts and commentators still cite 
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber frequently, that case presented the 
unusual question of whether it would be cruel and unusual for a state to 
electrocute a capital inmate after the initial electrocution attempt 
failed.
307
 
To add more confusion, the most relevant Supreme Court precedent at 
issue in Glossip was the highly fractured decision in Baze v. Rees.
308
 
That case resulted in seven separate opinions, none of which garnered 
more than three votes. Though some courts and commentators (including 
this author) have treated Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion as 
controlling,
309
 others have questioned this proposition,
310
 including 
Justice Sotomayor in her Glossip dissent.
311
 Moreover, even if one 
accepts the Roberts plurality opinion as the holding of the Court, that 
                                                     
304. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
305. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890). 
306. See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
319, 334 (1997).  
307. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 460–61 (1947). 
308. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
309. See Berger, supra note 27, at 279. See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”). 
310. See Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, 
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 213–17 (2009) (arguing “there is . . . no justification 
for affording a non-majority standard the imprimatur of the Eighth Amendment”). 
311. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2793 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether the Baze plurality’s requirement that a lethal injection plaintiff must prove the 
availability of an alternative method of execution constituted the holding of the Court).  
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opinion could be read as articulating different legal standards, sowing 
legal uncertainty.
312
 
That said, there are certain principles animating these decisions. Prior 
to Glossip, Supreme Court method-of-execution cases signaled the 
Eighth Amendment’s protection against excruciating deaths.313 In 
Kemmler, for example, the Court quoted the New York Court of Appeals 
conclusion that there was little 
to warrant the belief that this new mode of execution 
[electrocution] is cruel, within the meaning of the 
constitution . . . . On the contrary, we agree with the court below 
that it removes every reasonable doubt that the application of 
electricity to the vital parts of the human body, under such 
conditions and in the manner contemplated by the statute, must 
result in instantaneous, and consequently in painless, death.
314
 
Kemmler, thus, found the challenged execution method unproblematic, 
because the evidence indicated that the execution would result in 
painless death.
315
 
Resweber, too, evinced a similar concern for protecting the 
condemned from pain. Some courts have emphasized Resweber’s 
statement that “[a]ccidents happen for which no man is to blame,” as 
though to suggest that courts should excuse painful executions as 
unfortunate but tolerable.
316
 However, some readers miss that, 
immediately prior to this sentence, Justice Reed explained, “As nothing 
has been brought to our attention to suggest the contrary, we must and 
do assume that the state officials carried out their duties under the death 
warrant in a careful and humane manner.”317 In other words, the Eighth 
Amendment forgives the state for unforeseeable accidents but protects 
the condemned from executions in which state officials have not taken 
care to assure that death is achieved in “a careful and humane 
manner.”318 In Resweber, there was no reason to think that state officials 
                                                     
312. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1347–54. 
313. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a thorough summary of pre-Glossip method-
of-execution cases. For a comprehensive discussion of those cases, see generally Denno, supra note 
306, at 333–46.  
314. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443–44 (1890) (quoting People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 
119 N.Y. 569, 579 (1890)).  
315. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443–44; see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) 
(“[P]unishments of torture . . . and all . . . unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden . . . .”).  
316. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (plurality opinion)). 
317. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462. 
318. See id. at 462. 
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had acted carelessly, but the case quite clearly contemplated that the 
outcome may be different where state officials do not carry out their 
duties carefully and humanely. 
Though Resweber rejected the inmate’s claim, like Kemmler, it also 
emphasized the constitutional prohibition of painful executions.
319
 “The 
traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law,” the plurality 
wrote, “forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the 
death sentence.”320 The plaintiff’s claim failed, not because the Court 
tolerated procedures giving rise to substantial risk of excruciating death, 
but because “[t]here [was] no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor 
any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.”321 Resweber, 
thus, expressed concern for the inmate’s experience during the 
execution. While the word “necessary” may signal that the law will 
tolerate some pain inherent in executions (such as, perhaps, the setting of 
a catheter), the import of Resweber, like Kemmler, is that courts must 
guard against the infliction of severe pain. 
Even the Baze plurality acknowledged that while “an isolated mishap 
alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation,”322 
execution procedures carrying a “substantial risk of serious harm” do.323 
Echoing Resweber, Baze noted that prison officials cannot be deemed 
“subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment,”324 
when an execution procedure’s systemic problems create serious risks of 
harm. Unforeseeable accidents, in other words, are one thing, but 
protocols that entail a sufficient “risk of future harm . . . can qualify as 
cruel and unusual punishment.”325 
Admittedly, this case law only can take us so far. Prior to Baze, the 
Court said little about risk. That said, Resweber gestured towards that 
problem when it differentiated between “accidents . . . for which no man 
is to blame” and cases in which state officials have not “carried out their 
duties . . . in a careful and humane manner.”326 Baze reasoned 
                                                     
319. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a 
lingering death.”). 
320. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463.  
321. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). 
322. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008).  
323. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). 
324. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846 n.9). 
325. Id. at 49.  
326. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462. 
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similarly.
327
 In other words, Eighth Amendment precedent differentiates 
between unforeseeable accidents, on the one hand, and more systemic 
procedural flaws, on the other. 
2. The Risk Standard 
Glossip’s deferential approach ignored these important Eighth 
Amendment principles. Glossip insisted that the plaintiffs had to prove 
that the challenged protocol is “sure or very likely to cause serious 
illness or needless suffering.”328 To justify this heightened risk standard, 
the Court emphasized that “because it is settled that capital punishment 
is constitutional, ‘it necessarily follows that there must be a 
[constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”329 “[W]hile most humans 
wish to die a painless death,” wrote Justice Alito, “many do not have 
that good fortune.”330 As though to confirm his articulation of the risk 
standard, Justice Alito repeated the “sure or very likely” language in four 
separate places.
331
 
This standard fails to incorporate the precedent’s concern for the 
inmate’s pain and attention to the state’s level of care.332 As articulated, 
the Glossip risk standard appears to tolerate a high risk of excruciating 
pain. Under this approach, a procedure that caused excruciating 
suffering 55% of the time would almost certainly be constitutional, 
because the pain, though likely, could not be called “very likely.” Under 
this standard, even a procedure causing great pain in, say, 70% of 
executions may pass muster.
333
 
                                                     
327. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (noting that procedures giving rise to a substantial risk of serious pain 
would violate the Eighth Amendment).  
328. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2736 (2015) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).  
329. Id. at 2732–33 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 47).  
330. See id. at 2733.  
331. See id. at 2736, 2737, 2739, 2745. 
332. The Court also does not acknowledge that its “sure or very likely” standard originated in a 
case about a prisoner’s exposure to secondhand smoke, see Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 
(1993), or explain why the risk standard in such a prison conditions case ought to apply also in the 
method-of-execution setting.  
333. Prior to Glossip, some informed commentators had understood the Eighth Amendment 
standard to weigh the risk of pain, the degree of pain, and the feasibility of alternative execution 
procedures mitigating that risk. See, e.g., Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital 
Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 851–52 (2010) (“The [Baze] plurality’s choice of a 
standard turned on what magnitude of pain was permissible, on how great a risk of pain . . . , and 
on . . . the availability of options that would decrease the risks.”). While one could possibly read 
Glossip’s language that the protocol be very likely to cause needless suffering as recognition that 
the availability of alternative methods is still part of the risk calculus, the Court hardly made this 
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Of course, the Court is surely correct that the Eighth Amendment 
cannot require states to eliminate all risk of pain.
334
 That said, Glossip’s 
articulation is in tension with Kemmler, Resweber, and even Baze’s 
concern for the inmate’s suffering.335 Nor does it square with the Court’s 
understanding that the Eighth Amendment requires the Court to judge 
punishments in accord with “evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”336 
This disregard for inmate suffering not only ignores important 
language from the Eighth Amendment precedent, but may not even 
further a legitimate governmental interest. Were the state to showcase 
brutal executions to deter future crime, there would be a plausible, albeit 
highly controversial, justification for painful executions. As Foucault 
famously observed, the public execution emphasizes government’s 
“emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority.”337 
Significantly, though, American executions today do not advance this 
interest. Lethal injection sometimes causes excruciating pain, but the 
state tries to conceal such suffering through a variety of mechanisms, 
such as paralytic drugs, closed blinds, and a sterile, medicalized 
setting.
338
 Where the state practice seeks to conceal whatever pain it 
causes, it can hardly be said to derive any deterrent effect from the pain 
it inflicts. Perhaps there is some retributive effect, but the Eighth 
Amendment typically does not allow thirst for retribution to justify the 
infliction of excruciating pain.
339
 
Of course, constitutional rights are almost never absolute. The First 
Amendment vigorously protects freedom of speech, but, as Justice 
Holmes explained, “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
                                                     
point clear. Moreover, to the extent the Court emphasized its alternate holdings, it seems to separate 
the risk of pain and the availability of alternatives into discrete inquiries.  
334. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733. 
335. See Semel, supra Part II.A. 
336. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
337. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 49 (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995); see also 
AUSTIN SARAT ET AL., GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY 7–8 (2014) (discussing Foucault). 
338. Cf. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“[F]iring 
squads can be messy, but if we are willing to carry out executions, we should not shield ourselves 
from the reality that we are shedding human blood. If we, as a society, cannot stomach the splatter 
from an execution carried out by firing squad, then we shouldn’t be carrying out executions at all.”). 
339. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 45 (1938) (arguing retribution is 
“vengeance in disguise”). 
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panic.”340 Similarly, though the Court has expressed concern for inmate 
suffering, Eighth Amendment precedent hardly treats that concern as a 
categorical prohibition on any infliction of pain. The Court, then, is 
correct to assign some weight to the states’ interests in carrying out 
executions. The Court, however, does not adequately justify letting that 
state interest so thoroughly dominate its Eighth Amendment analysis. In 
effect, the Court gives the states carte blanche to do what they want, thus 
effectively shutting the door on Eighth Amendment challenges in this 
entire area. 
3. The Proffer Requirement 
Glossip also insisted that the plaintiff identify a “known and available 
alternative method of execution” presenting a “significantly less severe 
risk” of pain.341 Baze, too, had included such a requirement.342 As with 
the Eighth Amendment risk standard, however, Glossip recast this 
requirement to make it even harder for the plaintiff to meet. Whereas 
Baze had bundled the availability of an alternative method and the risk 
of harm together,
343
 Glossip treated these requirements as logically 
distinct, emphasizing that each served as an independent ground for 
affirming the district court.
344
 
Glossip’s articulation of the proffer encourages courts to uphold even 
the most dangerous execution procedures so long as they find the 
plaintiffs’ proffered alternative unavailable. As the dissent explained, 
under the majority opinion, a court could not invalidate barbaric 
methods of execution if the plaintiff failed to proffer an alternative or if 
the court deemed the proffered method unavailable.
345
 Justice Alito 
objected to Justice Sotomayor’s arguments that the decision permits 
prisoners to be “drawn and quartered, slowly tortured to death, or 
actually burned at the stake,”346 but it is not clear why. As the dissent 
pointed out, the majority articulated a categorical rule: if the inmate fails 
                                                     
340. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
341. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2737 (2015).  
342. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57–61 (2008). One could arguably distinguish Baze on the 
grounds that the execution method at issue there was concededly constitutional if properly 
administered, whereas the Glossip plaintiffs contended that the method was always unconstitutional 
and that they therefore should not have to proffer an alternative at all. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra 
note 4, at 46–52. 
343. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52 (plurality opinion). 
344. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738–39. 
345. See id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
346. Id. at 2746 (quoting id. at 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).  
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to propose a known and available alternative, then the court must rule 
for the state.
347
 The majority’s language offers no exception. Perhaps we 
are to understand Justice Alito’s accusation that Justice Sotomayor has 
resorted “to this outlandish rhetoric”348 as an implicit acknowledgement 
that the proffer requirement ought not apply when the state’s method of 
execution crosses a certain line. The majority, however, nowhere 
expressly articulated this point. 
The majority’s treatment of the availability of an alternative method 
as a logically distinct, independent prong of the doctrine guts the Eighth 
Amendment in method-of-execution cases. Moreover, the Court’s 
willingness to accept the state’s word that it cannot find an alternative 
suggests that states can shut down Eighth Amendment litigation merely 
by stating that alternative methods are not available.
349
 The Court, in 
other words, uses deference here not just as a shield, but as a sword, 
preemptively offering states a roadmap to block this kind of litigation 
altogether. 
 * * * 
Once again, the Court’s approach to these issues is highly deferential 
to the states. Glossip essentially rewrote the Eighth Amendment as a 
federalism provision focusing on the states’ difficulties implementing 
capital punishment, and all but ignoring the inmate’s suffering.350 It is 
almost as though the Court forgot that a core constitutional value is to 
protect the unpopular from governmental abuse.
351
 
D. Deference as Spin 
The Court also offered its own spin of important facts surrounding the 
case. The Court did not explain how these facts were legally relevant, 
but its factual portrait helped create an atmosphere ostensibly justifying 
its other highly deferential moves. While this spin is not technically a 
form of legal deference, it nevertheless helped the Court craft a 
                                                     
347. See id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
348. Id. at 2746. 
349. See supra notes 164–179 and accompanying text. 
350. Cf. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733–34 (emphasizing difficulties states encountered procuring 
lethal injection drugs). 
351. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those convicted 
of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the 
dignity of all persons.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (“[I]f the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (emphasis added).  
04 - Berger.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:09 PM 
984 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:929 
 
deferential opinion. Like the litigator massaging a case’s background 
facts to create an atmosphere favorable to her client, the Court 
downplayed some crucial facts and mischaracterized others. 
1. Important Facts Ignored 
a. The History of Botched Executions 
Botched executions are mostly absent from the Court’s opinion. The 
majority briefly referenced two but only to minimize their relevance 
(and without ever using the word “botch”). First, during the statement of 
fact, the Court recounted the Lockett execution.
352
 Like the protocol at 
issue in Glossip, Oklahoma executed Mr. Lockett with a three-drug 
protocol beginning with midazolam. However, the Court emphasized 
that whereas the Lockett protocol included only 100 milligrams of 
midazolam, the new Oklahoma protocol calls for 500 milligrams.
353
 This 
difference, the majority indicated, rendered the Lockett botch irrelevant 
for purposes of judging the new protocol.
354
 
Second, at the end of its opinion, the majority disputed the relevance 
of the botched midazolam executions of Lockett and Joseph Wood, who 
loudly gasped repeatedly and took nearly two hours to die.
355
 It noted 
that investigation into the Lockett execution “concluded that the 
difficulties were due primarily to the execution team’s inability to obtain 
an IV access site.”356 The Court also brushed aside Arizona’s 
midazolam-based execution of Wood, because it “did not involve the 
protocol at issue here.”357 Both executions, therefore, had “little 
probative value for present purposes.”358 
The Court, however, failed to consider reasons why these and other 
botched executions may be probative. To begin, as a general matter, 
botches indicate that lethal injection does not always proceed as 
                                                     
352. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734–35; Botelho & Ford, supra note 276 (“[T]he convulsing got 
worse, it looked like his whole upper body was trying to lift off the gurney.”). 
353. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2734.  
354. See id. at 2746. Notwithstanding the Court’s sanguine assessment of the revised Oklahoma 
protocol, a subsequent multicounty grand jury report concluded that the execution protocol required 
further serious revision. See Oklahoma Interim Report, supra note 208, at 101–05. 
355. See Erik Eckholm, Arizona Takes Nearly Two Hours to Execute Inmate, N.Y. TIMES (July 
23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/us/arizona-takes-nearly-2-hours-to-execute-inmate. 
html [https://perma.cc/U893-N4ST].  
356. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2746.  
357. Id.  
358. Id.  
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planned.
359
 In his comprehensive book on execution methods, Austin 
Sarat calculates that 7.12% of lethal injection executions have been 
botched.
360
 To be sure, some drug combinations are more dangerous 
than others, but this research illustrates that the states do not always have 
the wherewithal to perform lethal injection safely.  
Indeed, Professor Sarat’s calculation may be on the low side, given 
that most lethal injection executions include a paralytic that conceals the 
inmate’s pain. For example, when Arizona executed Jeffrey Landrigan 
in 2010, its anesthetic thiopental had likely expired.
361
 Landrigan died 
with his eyes open, quite possibly because he was not anesthetized when 
the paralytic took effect.
362
 Around the same time, Georgia used the 
same batch of likely expired thiopental in executions of two other men, 
who also died with their eyes open.
363
 The media did not report these 
executions as botched, but it is quite possible that some or all of these 
inmates died excruciating deaths. 
State execution protocols further raise the likelihood that an inmate 
will be paralyzed but not anesthetized. Many states usually require a 
large overdose of the paralytic,
364
 so that the paralytic will take effect 
even if the catheter has slipped out of the vein. As a result, some inmates 
have likely received an inadequate dose of anesthetic (because some of 
the intended anesthetic spilled out of the veins into surrounding tissue) 
but a sufficient dose of paralytic. 
Second, the Court tried to explain away the relevance of the Lockett 
execution by highlighting problems with the IV access point. The 
problem with Lockett’s execution, the Court emphasized, was not the 
protocol itself but the fact that the state failed to set the catheter 
properly.
365
 Far from being reassuring, however, this explanation merely 
highlights systemic problems with lethal injection generally.
366
 Every 
                                                     
359. See Lain, supra note 275, at 841 (“Botched executions put the state on notice that there was 
a problem . . . .”). 
360. SARAT ET AL., supra note 337, at 177.  
361. See Liliana Segura, Pfizer’s Death Penalty Ban Highlights the Black Market in Execution 
Drugs, INTERCEPT (May 19, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/05/19/pfizers-death-
penalty-ban-highlights-the-black-market-in-execution-drugs/ [https://perma.cc/ZR37-TLR2]. 
362. See id.  
363. See id.  
364. See ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 134 (2007). 
365. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 Ct. 2726, 2734 (2015) (quoting investigation 
concluding that “the viability of the IV access point was the single greatest factor” contributing to 
the problematic Lockett execution). 
366. Id. at 2746 (“[T]he difficulties were due primarily to the execution team’s inability to obtain 
an IV access site.”).  
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lethal injection execution requires an IV access point. When the (often 
inexpert) execution team fails to set the catheter properly, a botched 
execution likely follows.
367
 In Lockett’s case, Oklahoma provided 
inadequate equipment to a reluctant doctor, who attempted a femoral 
insertion after his attempt to access other veins failed.
368
 In other states, 
personnel have also struggled to insert the catheter properly.
369
 Many 
executions also involve inmates with compromised veins, adding further 
complications.
370
 IV access challenges, then, are part of lethal injection 
and substantially heighten the already significant risks of pain posed by 
the states’ selected drugs. 
Third, and relatedly, the Court failed to grasp that midazolam’s failure 
to anesthetize Mr. Lockett helped demonstrate that drug’s dangers in 
lethal injection. The majority may have been thinking (but did not 
explain) that the botch was not probative of midazolam’s anesthetic 
qualities, because Oklahoma improperly set the catheter, so the inmate’s 
veins never received the full intended dose of midazolam. However, as 
the record indicated, midazolam takes effect merely by absorbing into a 
person’s muscle tissue; unlike many drugs, it does not need to enter a 
person’s veins to work.371 Accordingly, if midazolam were an acceptable 
substitute for thiopental or pentobarbital, it would have still rendered 
Lockett unconscious and insensate to painful stimuli. But though the 
midazolam did absorb into Lockett’s muscle tissue, it did not maintain 
unconsciousness. Lockett’s execution, thus, provides a real world 
example confirming the scientific literature’s view that midazolam 
cannot maintain anesthesia against excruciating stimuli.
372
 
                                                     
367. See Ben Crair, Photos from a Botched Execution, NEW REPUBLIC (May 29, 2016), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/117898/lethal-injection-photos-angel-diazs-botched-execution-
florida [https://perma.cc/9FAX-C5KB].  
368. See Lockett Execution Report, supra note 224, at 16–17; supra section II.B.2.  
369. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 27, at 270; Kevin Fagan, The Execution of Stanley Tookie 
Williams, S.F. GATE (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/THE-EXECUTION-OF-
STANLEY-TOOKIE-WILLIAMS-2588632.php [https://perma.cc/H98F-SMX7] (“The first 
catheter slid in messily . . . spurting so much blood at the needle point that a cotton swab was 
soaked . . . . [A second technician then] had to poke for 11 minutes before her needle hit home.”); 
Chris McDaniel, Georgia Executioners Struggled to Set IVs in Recent Lethal Injections, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/georgia-executioners-struggled-to-
set-ivs-in-recent-lethal-i#.xsAGoyANK [https://perma.cc/P5KX-RJY8] (detailing Georgia’s 
problems setting IV lines in executions). 
370. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1335.  
371. See Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 116 (explaining that midazolam takes effect 
relatively rapidly whether it enters the body through veins or muscles). 
372. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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Finally, the Court limited its discussion to two botches, ignoring 
many others, including some involving midazolam. In Ohio, Dennis 
McGuire gasped and convulsed for ten to thirteen minutes and took 
twenty-four minutes to die.
373
 To be sure, Ohio, like Arizona, used a 
different drug combination than Oklahoma. Nevertheless, in 2014 and 
2015, there were fourteen executions using midazolam,
374
 of which three 
(McGuire, Lockett, and Wood) have been obviously botched. A fourth 
(Warner) called out “[m]y body is on fire.”375 Counting Warner, 28.5% 
of these midazolam executions have been problematic. Moreover, twelve 
of the fourteen midazolam executions included a paralytic,
376
 so the lack 
of other visible botches is hardly conclusive evidence that other inmates 
did not suffer excruciating deaths. The Court’s casual assessment that 
other midazolam-based executions “have been conducted without 
significant problems,”377 then, fails to address the history honestly. 
Ignoring botched executions when discussing lethal injection is like 
ignoring accidents when discussing highway safety. Of course, these 
events may not be comparably tragic, but, like car accidents, botched 
executions happen. While some protocols may mitigate the risk, it defies 
reason to assume that a revised protocol will entirely eliminate it. A 
revised protocol, of course, will alter the risks, sometimes marginally, 
sometimes dramatically. But the Court’s assertion that past botches 
“have little probative value”378 to the possibility of future botches speaks 
to an approach so deferential that it refuses to grapple with inconvenient 
facts. 
b. The Agony of Potassium Chloride 
Also conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is a description 
of the kind of suffering at issue. The plaintiffs were not objecting to 
                                                     
373. See Dana Ford & Ashley Fantz, Controversial Execution in Ohio Uses New Drug 
Combination, 
CNN (Jan. 17, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/16/justice/ohio-dennis-mcguire-
execution/ [https://perma.cc/3BPE-P3LZ] (“He gasped deeply. It was kind of a rattling, guttural 
sound. There was kind of a snorting through his nose. A couple of times, he definitely appeared to 
be choking.”). 
374. See Executions in the United States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/executions-united-states [https://perma.cc/7LF8-PHXQ] .  
375. See Dana Ford, Oklahoma Executes Charles Warner, CNN (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:13 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/15/us/oklahoma-execution-charles-frederick-warner/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8L7-FPE8]. 
376. See Executions in the United States, supra note 374. 
377. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746 (2015).  
378. Id. 
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modest pain, such as the insertion of a catheter. Rather, they were 
challenging the risk of the agonizing pain caused by potassium 
chloride.
379
 No one doubts that the injection of potassium chloride into 
human veins is excruciating. As the dissenting Justices put it, the drug 
causes “searing pain”380 akin to “burning somebody alive.”381 
The majority made almost no reference to this pain, or to the agony of 
suffocation caused by the paralytic.
382
 The majority is correct, of course, 
that some pain is inherent in lethal injection and that the Eighth 
Amendment cannot prohibit all pain.
383
 But the agonies created by 
potassium chloride and paralytic drugs are extreme. 
The Court downplayed this pain and even chided the dissent for its 
“groundless suggestion that our decision is tantamount to allowing 
prisoners to be . . . burned at the stake.’”384 But notwithstanding Justice 
Alito’s insistence that the dissent’s charges are “simply not true,”385 the 
dissent was correct about the potential for excruciating agony. Of course, 
whether the inmate actually feels this pain depends on whether he is 
anesthetized, and the majority and dissent disagreed on the risk. Even so, 
the majority’s indignant response here helps highlight its failure to 
acknowledge the degree of suffering potentially at issue. Indeed, the 
majority seemed to resent the very existence of a counter-narrative, even 
though the dissent’s narrative was largely correct. 
2. Gratuitous or Questionable Facts Included 
a. “Guerilla War Against the Death Penalty” 
The Glossip majority emphasized that the inmate plaintiffs were 
obstructing American capital punishment. In particular, it strongly 
suggested that the plaintiffs deserve blame for—or, at least, should 
shoulder the consequences of—the drug shortage frustrating states.386 
The majority’s recitation of the facts emphasized that anti-death penalty 
“activists” had pressured pharmaceutical companies to stop selling drugs 
                                                     
379. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008); Warner PI Hearing, supra note 64, at 353 (“I 
don’t think anybody would dispute [that potassium chloride causes great pain] . . . .”). 
380. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2781 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
381. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14–7955) [hereinafter 
Glossip Oral Argument]. 
382. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 53; Berger, supra note 27, at 266. 
383. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733. 
384. Id. at 2746.  
385. Id. 
386. See id. at 2733–35 (recounting state difficulties procuring drugs). 
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for use in executions and implied that they were using various tactics to 
prevent states from getting the drugs for their protocols.
387
 Justice Alito 
foreshadowed the gist of the opinion at oral argument when he asked 
whether the Court ought to “countenance what amounts to a guerilla war 
against the death penalty . . . to make it impossible for the States to 
obtain drugs that could be used to carry out capital punishment with 
little, if any, pain?”388 In short, the majority indicated that anti-death 
penalty activists have made the bed and that capital inmates must now 
sleep in it. 
As an initial matter, it is far from clear that the Court’s narrative here, 
even if factually correct, is legally relevant. The Eighth Amendment 
imposes a bar on excruciating executions and should bind the states 
regardless of whether surrounding circumstances make it more difficult 
for states to create safe execution protocols.
389
 Surely a state could not 
inject an inmate with only potassium chloride if no anesthetic were 
available. Thus, just as the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal 
defendant a fair trial even when the defendant himself has retained 
ineffective counsel, so too does the Eighth Amendment likely prohibit 
excruciating execution procedures, even when the state has difficulty 
obtaining the necessary drugs.
390
 
Even if the Court’s narrative were legally relevant, it is still factually 
mistaken. Death row inmates are not responsible for the current drug 
shortage.
391
 The inmates themselves manifestly lack the resources and 
wherewithal to create a drug shortage. Nor have domestic abolitionist 
“activists” played much of a role. To the contrary, as Jim Gibson and 
Corinna Lain recount, the European Union and European governments 
have imposed strict controls to ensure that exported drugs will not be 
used for executions.
392
 For instance, when Hospira tried to manufacture 
                                                     
387. See id. at 2733 (“Activists then pressured both the company and the Italian Government to 
stop the sale of sodium thiopental for use in lethal injections in this country.”). 
388. Glossip Oral Argument, supra note 381, at 14–15 (question of Alito, J.); see also id. at 15 
(arguing that some lethal injection drugs “have been rendered unavailable by the abolitionist 
movement putting pressure on the companies that manufacture them”) (Scalia, J.). 
389. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510–13 (2011) (holding that a court has a responsibility to 
remedy an Eighth Amendment violation resulting from prison overcrowding, even if doing so 
requires the release of some prisoners).  
390. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment would stand for 
little if the often uninformed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the 
defendant’s entitlement to constitutional protection [against ineffective assistance of counsel].”).  
391. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners here had no part in 
creating the shortage of execution drugs.”).  
392. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 41, at 1240–45; Juergen Baetz, America’s Lethal Injection 
Drug Crisis Starts In Europe, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www. 
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thiopental in Italy, Italian authorities threatened legal action if the 
company could not ensure that the drug would not be used by states in 
executions.
393
 Hospira subsequently stopped manufacturing thiopental 
altogether.
394
 
European pharmaceutical companies have internalized these values. 
For example, the Danish pharmaceutical company Lundbeck was 
“adamantly opposed” to its product being used in executions.395 
Similarly, the Swiss pharmaceutical company Naari AG was “shocked 
and appalled by” news that Nebraska planned to use its drugs in 
executions.
396
 
Indeed, the health care industry both at home and abroad—like 
doctors themselves—is often hesitant to involve itself in the death 
penalty.
397
 Unsurprisingly, some pharmaceutical industry officials 
believe that use of drugs in executions “contradicts everything we are in 
business to do[—]provide therapies that improve people’s lives.”398 The 
International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists, too, has 
discouraged its members from providing drugs for use in executions.
399
 
                                                     
businessinsider.com/americas-lethal-injection-drug-crisis-starts-in-europe-2014-2#ixzz3lB0a7fDq 
[https://perma.cc/UF66-4PM7]; EU Imposes Strict Controls on ‘Execution Drug’ Exports, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16281016 [https://perma.cc/B2UT-
3BBW].  
393. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 41, at 1240–41.  
394. See Press Release, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Statement Regarding Pentothal™ Market Exit 
(Jan. 21, 2011), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=175550&p=irolnews Article&ID=1518 
610&.print&ID1518610 [https://perma.cc/YWM6-JX5P]. 
395. See Letter from Staffan Schüberg, President, Lundbeck Inc., to Gary C. Mohr, Dir., Ohio 
Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr. (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ 
LundbeckLethInj.pdf [https://perma.cc/88B8-PPT9] [hereinafter Schüberg Letter]; see also Gibson 
& Lain, supra note 41, at 1227–28; Emma Marris, Death-Row Drug Dilemma, NATURE (Jan. 27, 
2011), http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110127/full/news.2011.53.html [https://perma.cc/QGB5-
KBW8]. 
396. See Associated Press, Swiss Company Demands Nebraska Return Drug Intended For Use In 
Lethal Injections, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/nebraska-
swiss-naari-ag-sodium-thiopental-2011-11 [https://perma.cc/8YEM-DYHJ]. 
397. See, e.g., Pfizer’s Position on Use of Our Products in Lethal Injections for Capital 
Punishment, PFIZER.COM (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.pfizer.com/files/b2b/GlobalPolicyPaper 
LethalInjection.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WYN-HZ77] [hereinafter PFIZER]. Doctors and nurses, too, 
are mostly opposed to involvement in executions. The American Medical Association, the 
American College of Physicians, the American Public Health Association, and the American 
Nursing Association have all publicly opposed healthcare professionals’ involvement in executions. 
See SARAT ET AL., supra note 337, at 119. 
398. See Schüberg Letter, supra note 395. 
399. See Deborah Denno, Symposium: “Groundhog Day” Indeed, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-groundhog-day-indeed [https://perma.cc/X3HK-
YCRM]. 
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Even corporate executives and pharmacists without such sentiments 
might worry that participating in capital punishment would jeopardize 
their businesses.
400
 To be sure, anti-death penalty sentiment contributes 
to these developments, but the phenomenon runs much deeper than 
fringe “activism.” To the contrary, it reflects a deeper “transmission of 
international abolitionist norms” that are not going away.401 
Additionally, some drug shortages have resulted from events 
completely disconnected from death-penalty politics.
402
 For example, 
thiopental is in very short supply for reasons that have nothing to do 
with capital punishment. Anesthesiologists today favor newer 
anesthetics over thiopental, thus sharply reducing the incentive to 
manufacture the drug.
403
 Compounding the problem, the sole U.S. 
thiopental manufacturer stopped production of it in 2010 due to an 
“unspecified raw material supply problem.”404 The FDA also prohibits 
its importation, because thiopental is not an “approved” drug and federal 
law forbids the importation of unapproved drugs.
405
 Along similar lines, 
there is also a shortage of pancuronium bromide, affecting hospitals 
nationwide.
406
 
These episodes demonstrate that the factors behind the drug shortage 
are numerous. Some are even disconnected from death-penalty politics. 
Of course, inmates’ lawyers have sought to benefit from these conditions 
at times, such as challenging states’ efforts to import drugs illegally.407 
But even those efforts have not created the shortage so much as sought 
to enforce pre-existing federal law, which some states attempted to 
                                                     
400. See Alper, supra note 177 (citing evidence that “corporate leaders are convinced that using 
their medical products to induce death does not comport with the mission or financial interests of 
their companies”). 
401. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 41, at 1218. 
402. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
403. See Denno, supra note 399. 
404. Carol J. Williams, Maker of Anesthetic Used in Executions is Discontinuing Drug, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/22/local/la-me-execution-drug-20110122 
[https://perma.cc/5WKM-HL7J; see also Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Shortage of Drug Holds up Some 
U.S. Executions, NBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39385026/ns/ 
health-health_care/t/shortage-drug-holds-some-us-executions/#.Ve8L15fl-7Q [https://perma.cc/2U 
J7-DLBU].  
405. See 21 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2012) (stipulating that unapproved drugs “shall be refused 
admission” into the country); Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
406. See FDA Drug Shortages, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
scripts/drugshortages/dsp_ActiveIngredientDetails.cfm?AI=Pancuronium%20Bromide%20Injection
&st=c&tab=tabs-1 [https://perma.cc/F32T-D3UG]. 
407. See Cook, 733 F.3d at 4. 
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violate. Glossip’s implication that domestic activists bear the blame for 
the drug shortage, then, does not withstand scrutiny. 
Additionally, the Court was misleading when it implied that the 
dissent’s approach would have effectively overruled earlier decisions 
upholding the constitutionality of capital punishment.
408
 To the contrary, 
a ruling for the plaintiffs would have invalidated only the use of 
midazolam, which is just one of many drugs used in lethal injection 
protocols. Numerous other protocols would have remained 
constitutional, including those still used regularly in states like Texas 
and Missouri.
409
 And, of course, some states can and have turned to 
different methods of execution, such as lethal gas or the firing squad.
410
 
To this extent, the majority’s insistence that a holding for the plaintiffs 
would have been tantamount to a rejection of capital punishment is a 
canard. The Court’s discussion of the drug shortage, then, perhaps adds 
rhetorical force to its narrative that states face difficulties carrying out 
executions, but this spin is neither legally relevant nor factually accurate. 
Finally, in addition to misunderstanding the multiple causes of the 
drug shortage, the Court’s narrative incorrectly suggests that method-of-
execution litigation frequently succeeds in forcing states to revise their 
execution protocols. It usually doesn’t. Not only do many state lethal 
injection protocols remain deeply problematic,
411
 but many courts do not 
even grant lethal-injection plaintiffs a fair hearing on the merits. 
Capital inmates seeking to guard against excruciating executions, in 
fact, often face a catch-22.
412
 When an inmate challenges a lethal 
injection protocol in advance, courts sometimes dismiss the case as 
unripe, on the theory that the state may change its protocol before that 
inmate’s execution date.413 Oklahoma, in fact, sought to dismiss all the 
                                                     
408. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015) (“[W]e have time and again 
reaffirmed that capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional. We decline to effectively overrule 
these decisions.”) (internal citations omitted).  
409. See State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/V7YN-6YVN] (listing state lethal injection protocol 
information, including numerous states that do not use midazolam). 
410. See Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
methods-execution [https://perma.cc/GJ92-AV36]; James C. Feldman, Comment, Nothing Less than 
the Dignity of Man: The Eighth Amendment and State Efforts to Reinstitute Traditional Methods of 
Execution, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1313, 1330–36 (2015). 
411. See generally Denno, supra note 35, at 1339–46, 1360–76. 
412. See Berger, supra note 27, at 294. 
413. See Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635, 639 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007); Alley v. Little, 452 F.3d 621, 
625 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting); Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 583 n.3 (Mo. 
2005); Gonzales v. State, 353 S.W.3d 826, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 
757, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Berger, supra note 27, at 294.  
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Glossip plaintiffs whose executions were not imminent.
414
 However, 
when inmates wait to file their challenges when their execution is 
imminent, courts usually deny the stay of execution that would permit 
the litigation to proceed.
415
 Similarly, when inmates, as in Glossip, try to 
challenge a new lethal injection protocol adopted on the eve of a 
scheduled execution, courts, at best, grant them a limited hearing or, at 
worst, dismiss their cases as dilatory.
416
 These procedural hurdles hardly 
seem like the hallmark of a fair judicial system, and, in all events, belie 
the Court’s narrative that the inmates’ litigation strategy has waged a 
successful “guerilla war” on capital punishment. 
b. The Condemned’s Crimes 
While the Court neglected to discuss the excruciating pain caused by 
potassium chloride, it did describe the murders committed by each 
petitioner.
417
 These were horrific crimes, and the persons who committed 
them deserve very severe penalties.
418
 But the nature of the crimes is 
also irrelevant to Glossip’s Eighth Amendment issue. After all, the 
Glossip plaintiffs were not filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
disputing the legitimacy of their sentences. Rather, they were bringing a 
civil rights action challenging how those sentences could be carried 
out.
419
 Even had they won their case, the plaintiffs still could have been 
executed by lethal injection, albeit by a somewhat different protocol.
420
 
Indeed, the Court usually does not reference the inmates’ crimes in 
other civil rights Eighth Amendment actions, involving, for instance, 
                                                     
414. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (July 16, 2014), at 11, 14, Warner v. Gross, No. 14-665 
(July 16, 2014) 2014 WL 7671680 (“[A] challenge to a specific method or practice set out in a 
protocol years in advance of a possible execution is not ripe.”). 
415. See, e.g., Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting motion for stay of 
execution because plaintiff did not bring his claim early enough); Berry v. Epps, 506 F.3d 402, 405 
(5th Cir. 2007) (“Our precedent requires the dismissal of ‘eleventh hour’ dilatory claims . . . .”); 
Grayson v. Allen, 491 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). 
416. See Berger, supra note 27, at 293–94. 
417. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015).  
418. Interestingly, the lead plaintiff, Richard Glossip, may not have been guilty of murder. See 
Matt Ford, The Troubling Case of Richard Glossip, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-troubling-case-of-richard-glossip/405646/ 
[https://perma.cc/47UX-VX7V]; Mark Graber, Richard Glossip, BALKINIZATION (July 6, 2015), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/07/richard-glossip.html [https://perma.cc/5Z78-77DQ].  
419. Cf. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579–83 (2006) (permitting the plaintiff to bring his 
challenge under § 1983 because “Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State 
from executing him by lethal injection.”). 
420. See id.; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004). 
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prison conditions or medical care.
421
 Perhaps the majority reiterated the 
capital inmates’ crimes to emphasize the propriety of their capital 
sentences, but the plaintiffs had not challenged their sentences’ 
legitimacy.
422
 The Court’s willingness to describe these crimes but not 
the pain associated with potassium chloride further highlights its efforts 
to paint a portrait sympathetic to the State and hostile to the plaintiffs. 
III. EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. Explanations 
1. Discouraging Frivolous Litigation 
Various factors help explain Glossip’s great deference. To begin, the 
Court approached the case impatiently as symptomatic of an entire class 
of frivolous litigation that needlessly consumes judicial resources and 
delays the administration of justice. This impression is partially correct. 
Many capital inmates will likely challenge any method of execution, 
including safe ones. To this extent, the Court’s proffer requirement and 
general skepticism towards lethal injection litigation may not be correct, 
but it is understandable. 
Glossip also reflects concerns about civil rights litigation more 
generally. Indeed, the opinion is consistent with a broader judicial 
movement to limit the use of litigation to effect governmental change. 
Many federal judges today are sensitive to the charge that courts 
interfere too readily with the democratic branches.
423
 To this extent, 
Glossip is part of a larger judicial reaction against the use of courts to 
effect institutional reform.
424
 
A full discussion of the Supreme Court’s attitudes towards civil rights 
litigation is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few brief examples 
illustrate the point. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court heightened the 
pleading requirement for civil rights suits, making it more difficult for 
plaintiffs alleging government malfeasance to initiate civil litigation at 
all.
425
 Iqbal poses a particular problem for litigants in cases (like lethal 
                                                     
421. See generally Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
422. See Hill, 547 U.S. at 579–83; Nelson, 541 U.S. at 647. 
423. See Berger, supra note 27, at 296. 
424. See id. at 280–301. 
425. See Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing 
Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 533 (2010) (“Iqbal has strengthened district court 
discretion to dismiss civil rights and employment cases.”).  
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injection) where the government controls the relevant information. 
Specifically, it is difficult for a plaintiff to allege government 
wrongdoing with sufficient detail when she has access to none of the 
relevant information.
426
 Along similar lines, the Court has also seemed 
to heighten standing requirements in recent years.
427
 
The Court has also cut back on the availability of civil rights remedies 
in recent decades.
428
 It has even indicated that Ex Parte Young injunctive 
relief may not always be available against state officials for violations of 
federal law.
429
 And it has also bolstered the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity to protect state officials from suits for money damages.
430
 
These developments reflect the Court’s general discomfort with litigants 
using the federal courts to attack governmental policies. To this extent, 
Glossip is small part of a larger judicial project.
431
 
2. Protecting State Penological Interests 
Glossip also protected the states’ penological interests in carrying out 
lawfully imposed sentences of death. Some death penalty states have had 
difficulty carrying out executions, and the majority understood lethal 
injection litigation to be part of the problem. Glossip tries to make things 
easier for states that wish to continue executions. 
The majority, in fact, insisted that the states’ penological interests 
must figure heavily in the Eighth Amendment analysis. Justice Alito 
emphasized that “we have time and again reaffirmed that capital 
punishment is not per se unconstitutional.”432 Thus, “decisions in this 
area have been animated in part by the recognition that because it is 
settled that capital punishment is constitutional, ‘it necessarily follows 
                                                     
426. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697–98 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
427. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l U.S.A, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
428. See generally Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 (2007) (“[A] Bivens action to redress 
retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their property rights would invite 
claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental action . . . .”); Bd., of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappel v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296 (1983).  
429. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997). 
430. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996). 
431. Many of these cases were decided 5–4, so it is possible that the Court’s attitude towards 
these issues will change when Justice Scalia’s successor is ultimately confirmed.  
432. Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739 (2015); see also id. at 2731 (“The death 
penalty was an accepted punishment at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights.”).  
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that there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”433 The 
implication, of course, was that courts ought not inquire too rigorously 
into the safety of state lethal injection procedures, because states need 
flexibility in order to carry out death sentences.
434
 
While Glossip, of course, focuses specifically on capital punishment, 
these concerns also reflect broader federalism and separation-of-powers 
principles. Federal courts are understandably sometimes reluctant to 
displace state policy choices. Of course, these general principles do not 
explain the Court’s approach in any given case, because the Court is 
willing to intervene when it believes that a state has violated the 
Constitution. But where the Court is suspicious of the plaintiffs to begin 
with, these structural principles help justify judicial restraint. 
B. Implications 
1. Death Penalty Implications 
a. Lethal Injection Litigation 
By ratcheting up the Eighth Amendment standard in method-of-
execution cases, Glossip made it even harder for inmates to challenge 
lethal injection procedures successfully. Glossip, indeed, leaves state 
lethal injection practices in a kind of legal grey hole, in which the states’ 
interests in carrying out executions apparently always trumps the 
inmate’s Eighth Amendment interest in avoiding an excruciating 
execution.
435
 The Court, to be sure, goes through the motions of hearing 
the case, but at each step explains why it must defer to the State. 
That said, inmates still have some possible arguments in future lethal 
injection litigation. First, a plaintiff could plausibly contend that the 
“sure or very likely” standard only applies when plaintiffs request a stay 
of execution. Glossip itself, after all, applied that standard in the context 
of a motion to stay an execution,
436
 and federal courts frequently indicate 
that an execution stay is an “extraordinary remedy.”437 Though Glossip 
                                                     
433. Id. at 2732–33 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)).  
434. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733 (“[B]ecause some risk of pain is inherent in any method of 
execution, we have held that the Constitution does not require the avoidance of all risk of pain.”).  
435. See Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1118–31 (providing several examples of grey holes in the 
administrative state); supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
436. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2736 (noting that district court denied the motion for preliminary 
injunction in part because plaintiffs had not established a “sure or very likely” risk of serious 
suffering).  
437. See Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013); Adams v. Thaler, 659 F.3d 312, 
317–18 (5th Cir. 2012).  
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does not discuss whether its standard applies outside the stay context, 
there is certainly a colorable argument that an Eighth Amendment 
challenge not requiring a stay of execution should proceed under a 
different standard.
438
 
Second, while Glossip seems to require the plaintiff to prove that the 
procedure is “sure or very likely” to cause great pain, the majority 
opinion, like the Baze plurality, references other standards as well.
439
 
The Court, thus, leaves some wiggle room for inmates to argue that a 
different standard should apply.
440
 Given lower courts’ haphazard 
treatment of Baze,
441
 it is possible, if not terribly likely, that Glossip too 
will engender different standards. 
Third, though Glossip upheld the Oklahoma procedure, inmates in 
other states using midazolam could try to create a more favorable record 
about the drug’s pharmacological properties. The Court emphasized that 
its holding was closely tied to the district court record.
442
 To this extent, 
its statements about midazolam were not rulings on law, so they 
technically do not bind lower courts.
443
 In reality, many trial courts may 
be reluctant to announce factual findings contrary to those in Glossip 
absent a very compelling record,
444
 but the law permits such contrary 
findings. 
Fourth, there remains great variety in state lethal injection 
procedures,
445
 so even under Glossip’s onerous standard, courts will still 
have to assess the risks of a given state’s procedure. Plaintiffs can still 
try to challenge lethal injection procedures by presenting evidence about 
a state’s written protocol and its implementation of that protocol. 
Similarly, as drug companies increasingly object to the use of their 
products in executions,
446
 states will likely increasingly seek to procure 
their drugs from compounding pharmacies, the black market, and other 
                                                     
438. Cf. Berger, supra note 27, at 276 n.86. 
439. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737 (noting that an inmate challenging a protocol must show 
“there is a substantial risk of severe pain”).  
440. See id. (“To prevail on such a claim, there must be a substantial risk of serious harm, an 
objectively intolerable risk of harm that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were 
subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
441. See Denno, supra note 35, at 1346–53.  
442. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739–40. 
443. See FAIGMAN, supra note 99, at 2. 
444. See, e.g., Correll v. State, 184 So.3d 478, 487 (Fla. 2015) (“[T]he United States Supreme 
Court in Glossip upheld the use of midazolam in Oklahoma’s three-drug protocol.”). 
445. See State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/state-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/7LF8-PHXQ] .  
446. See, e.g., PFIZER, supra note 397. 
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unreliable sources.
447
 As evidence of state incompetence and use of 
unregulated drugs continues to mount, some of these cases may be 
successful. Indeed, courts should be especially suspicious of state 
practices where there is good reason to think that the state is using 
unreliable drugs. 
Fifth, a plaintiff may make fact-specific claims that a particular 
procedure or drug is especially risky for him given particular medical 
conditions. For example, after Glossip, a Florida inmate contended that 
the State’s procedure posed special risks given his medical history.448 
Given the proper facts, such an argument might occasionally work, 
though, admittedly, it usually will be a long shot.
449
 
Finally, inmates may consider bringing method-of-execution 
challenges in state court under state law. States sometimes adopt 
execution protocols without complying with state law.
450
 State courts in 
those instances may halt executions not because the protocol is too 
dangerous, but because the state failed to comply with required 
administrative procedures.
451
 
Relatedly, inmates may consider challenging the safety of execution 
procedures not under the Eighth Amendment but under analogous state 
constitutional provisions.
452
 While some state constitution’ provisions 
                                                     
447. See Erik Eckholm, Pfizer Blocks the Use of Its Drugs in Executions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/14/us/pfizer-execution-drugs-lethal-injection.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/2XTZ-269B]; Segura, supra note 361. 
448. See Correll v. Florida, SC15-147, at 1–2 (Fla. July 23, 2015) (remanding for evidentiary 
hearing to consider inmate’s claim that the use of midazolam is unconstitutional as applied to him in 
light of his brain damage and history of chemical dependency). 
449. See Correll v. State, 184 So.3d 478,  487–90 (Fla. 2015). 
450. See Smith v. Montana, No. 2008-303, slip op. at 11 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015) 
(permanently enjoining Montana from using its lethal injection protocol because it did not comply 
with state statute); Jeff Amy, Judge Orders Temporary Halt to Mississippi Executions, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/08/25/judge-orders-
temporary-halt-to-mississippi-executions [https://perma.cc/KM3G-2XWS] (noting that federal 
judge issued temporary restraining order because Mississippi law requires three drug procedure, but 
Mississippi planned to conduct execution with just two drugs). 
451. See Amy, supra note 450; Arnold Rochvarg, How Administrative Law Halted the Death 
Penalty in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 119, 119, 124–25 (2007) (discussing the successful 
administrative law lethal injection challenge in Maryland). 
452. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 9; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. II, 
§ 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. XVII; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IND. 
CONST. art. I, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17; MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 16; MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 21; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 22; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. I, pt. 12; 
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OR. CONST. art. I, § 16; 
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9; VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 
5; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
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merely track the Eighth Amendment,
453
 others, such as those prohibiting 
“cruel or unusual” punishment, arguably offer broader protection.454 
Given Glossip’s stingy reading of the Eighth Amendment, inmates may 
find state constitutional law more protective.
455
 
b. Lethal Injection Practices 
Glossip made it harder for Eighth Amendment plaintiffs to prevail, 
but states will likely continue to have difficulty carrying out executions. 
Though other states after Glossip could choose to mimic Oklahoma’s 
protocol, so far they have not done so. For example, though South 
Carolina was having difficulty procuring other drugs, it was reluctant to 
adopt midazolam. As a South Carolina state official put it, “[S]ome of 
the folks in other states suffering for almost an hour. We would have to 
be comfortable that that would not happen.”456 Of course, since Glossip, 
some states have adopted midazolam or are contemplating such a 
                                                     
453. See, e.g., Donna E. Blanton, The State Constitution’s Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause: 
The Basis for Future Death Penalty Jurisprudence in Florida, 20 FLA. ST. L. REV. 229, 229 (1992) 
(noting the Florida Supreme Court’s “lockstep” approach to interpreting the State’s “cruel or 
unusual punishment” clause by rarely distinguishing it from its federal counterpart). 
454. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. 
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 9; LA. CONST. art. I, § 20; ME. CONST. art. I, § 9; MASS. CONST. pt. I, 
art. 26; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5; MISS. CONST. art. 3, § 28; NEV. CONST. 
art. I, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 33; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 9; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14; 
State v. Mata, 745 N.W. 2d 229, 257, 261 (Neb. 2008); State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 16 (2015); 
People v. Yepez, 2011 WL 1554729, at *8 n.14 (Santa Cruz Cnty. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2011); People 
v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W. 2d 827, 829 (Mich. 1972); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W. 2d 866, 874 (Mich. 
1992); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 886–87 (Cal. 1972).  
455. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). 
456. Tim Waller, South Carolina Death Row Inmates Won’t Be Executed Anytime Soon, 
WYFF4.COM, (July 22, 2015, 5:13 AM) http://www.wyff4.com/news/south-carolina-death-row-
inmates-wont-be-executed-anytime-soon/34277610 [https://perma.cc/TNZ7-RJCM] (quoting 
Director of South Carolina DOC). 
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switch.
457
 Nevertheless, it is notable that, at least so far, many death 
penalty states do not seem to be rushing to embrace the drug.
458
 
Even more importantly, it is hardly clear that either midazolam or 
other drugs will remain available for executions. As noted above, some 
drug companies in recent years have sought to restrict states’ access to 
drugs for lethal injection, and other drugs are in short supply for other 
reasons.
459
 Many states turned from thiopental to pentobarbital, because 
thiopental became unavailable.
460
 As some states now apparently 
struggle to find pentobarbital, they are turning to midazolam. But 
midazolam may not always be available either. Akorn, an Illinois-based 
drug company, requested that Arizona’s Department of Corrections 
return its supply of midazolam.
461
 Akorn also announced that it would 
no longer ship any of its drugs directly to prisons.
462
 The drug also 
recently appeared on an American Society of Health-System 
Pharmacists bulletin listing current drug shortages.
463
 Even more 
importantly, Pfizer recently announced sweeping controls to try to 
ensure that none of its drugs are used in lethal injection.
464
 Pfizer 
manufacturers most of the drugs used in lethal injection protocols.
465
 As 
a result of its announcement, one commentator noted that “all F.D.A.-
                                                     
457. See Steve Barnes, Arkansas Just Got One Step Closer to Ending Its Decade-Long Execution 
Hiatus, REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-arkansas-buys-lethal-
injection-drugs-aims-to-end-execution-hiatus-2015-8?IR=T [https://perma.cc/BS2F-WATU] (noting 
local reports stating that Arkansas had purchased drugs for its execution procedure, including 
midazolam); Jack Elliott Jr., Attorney General Seeks Execution Date for Death Row Inmate, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 29, 2015), http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/MS_JORDAN_ 
EXECUTION_MSOL-?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT [https://perma. 
cc/9PAB-B6ZT] (“The Mississippi Department of Corrections amended its lethal injection protocol 
Tuesday to include the use of midazolam.”).  
458. See Chris McDaniel, So Far, States Haven’t Rushed To Embrace Execution Drug Approved 
by U.S. Supreme Court, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 21, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrismcdaniel/ 
so-far-states-havent-rushed-to-embrace-execution-drug-approv#.yiMno7VvJ 
[https://perma.cc/23NA-YLDT]. 
459. See supra Part II.D.2.a. 
460. See Gibson & Lain, supra note 41, at 1227; Denno, supra note 35, at 1360–65.  
461. See Kim Bellware, Manufacturer Asks Prisons to Return Supply of Controversial Lethal 
Injection Drug, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/22/ 
arizona-lethal-injection-drug-return_n_7118486.html [https://perma.cc/4C3T-Y3D9].  
462. See id. 
463. See Drug Shortages: Current Shortages Bulletin, Midazolam Injections, AM. SOC’Y OF 
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACISTS (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.ashp.org/menu/DrugShortages/Current 
Shortages/Bulletin.aspx?id=858 [https://perma.cc/9HLG-].  
464. See Eckholm, supra note 447. 
465. See PFIZER, supra note 397 (listing Propofol, pancuronium bromide, midazolam, 
hydromorphone, rocuronium bromide, vecuronium bromide and potassium chloride). 
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approved manufacturers of any potential execution drug have now 
blocked their sale for this purpose.”466 
To be sure, states may still be able to get midazolam (or other drugs) 
on the black market or elsewhere, despite the manufacturing companies’ 
objections. But some will not. Several states, including Alabama, 
Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, and Virginia, have had difficulties 
obtaining drugs recently.
467
 To this extent, some states likely will 
continue to struggle to carry out executions, notwithstanding Glossip. 
More generally, states are executing fewer people nationwide than 
they have in years. There were only 28 executions nationwide in 2015, 
the lowest number in well over two decades.
468
 In the ten years between 
1997 and 2006, the nation collectively executed an average of 70 people 
each year, with a high of 98 executions in 1999.
469
 Since 2006, the 
country has averaged 40 executions annually.
470
 Executions are clearly 
on the decline. 
Of course, the drug shortage plays some role in this decline, as even 
states that want to carry out executions are having a difficult time doing 
so. But the drug shortage is only part of the story. Death sentences have 
also decreased steadily since the mid-1990s.
471
 Courts have imposed 
                                                     
466. See Eckholm, supra note 447.  
467. See Mark Berman, Ohio Drops Controversial Lethal Injection Drug, Postpones Upcoming 
Execution, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/ 
2015/01/09/ohio-drops-controversial-lethal-injection-drug-postpones-upcoming-execution/ [https:// 
perma.cc/X868-A7KP] (explaining that drug shortage required postponing executions); Amanda 
Sakuma, Arkansas Judge Halts 8 Upcoming Executions, MSNBC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/arkansas-judge-halts-8-upcoming-executions [https://perma.cc/CD28 
-4Q55]; Rick Green, Oklahoma Governor Says Future of Death Penalty Uncertain After Mix-Ups, 
THE OKLAHOMAN (Oct. 8, 2015), http://newsok.com/article/5452114 [https://perma.cc/H63F-
HCB8]; Ohio Delays Executions Until 2017 over Lack of Lethal Drugs, CBSNEWS (Oct. 19, 2015), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ohio-delays-executions-until-2017-over-lack-of-lethal-drugs/ 
[https://perma.cc/UL7R-4HTR]; Manny Fernandez, Delays as Death-Penalty States Scramble for 
Execution Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/09/us/death-
penalty-lethal-injection.html [https://perma.cc/J872-XP6Z]; Tim Lockette, Court Records Show 
Pharmacists Refused Death Penalty Drugs, THE ANNISTON STAR (Jan. 3, 2016), 
http://www.annistonstar.com/news/court-records-show-pharmacists-refused-death-penalty-drugs/ 
article_61ca7062-b1e0-11e5-ac9e-db30e09f373a.html [https://perma.cc/JC76-PQ6S]; Frank Green, 
Virginia Says It Lacks Drugs Needed for Lethal Injections, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 24, 
2016), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_e148a875-b3b5-5451-845c-34c2e1fe9924.html 
[https://perma.cc/3HNH-2W6H]. 
468. See Executions by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year [https://perma.cc/DH4K-ANYZ].  
469. See id. 
470. See id. 
471. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-
2008 [https://perma.cc/F8ZM-LLZQ].  
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fewer than 100 capital sentences in each year since 2010, with only 49 
such sentences in 2015.
472
 Seven states have abolished their death 
penalty since 2007,
473
 and Justice Breyer’s Glossip dissent may spur still 
more debate.
474
 In short, the politics and practices of capital punishment 
in the U.S. appear to be changing substantially. To this extent, Glossip’s 
practical reach may be quite limited. 
2. Judicial Implications 
The future of lethal injection post-Glossip may be unclear, but the 
Court’s approach to various sorts of deference sheds significant light on 
its willingness to steer its opinions towards outcomes it deems desirable. 
Throughout the opinion, the majority steered around legal and factual 
arguments that cut in favor of the plaintiffs. To the extent that some legal 
precedent and reasoning might have interfered with states’ prerogative to 
conduct executions, the Court repeatedly insisted that those principles 
should take a back seat to the imperative of carrying out death sentences. 
Notably, the Court barely attempted to justify its deference 
determinations, though there were powerful counter-arguments to the 
Court’s conclusions on each count. These inadequate justifications, 
coupled with the Court’s opportunistic spin of other facts, cast a dubious 
light on the entire opinion. The Court’s use of deference determinations 
as rhetorical tools makes the opinion read less like the decision of a 
neutral tribunal and more like the brief of a partisan advocate. 
Indeed, the fact that all these different kinds of deference happen to 
point in the same direction should cause suspicion. The Court’s 
emphatic marshalling of legally irrelevant facts certainly suggests that 
the Court was doing more than simply applying the law to the relevant 
facts. The heightened Eighth Amendment standard should also raise 
eyebrows, as the Court changed the legal test in this area without 
admitting that it had done so. Perhaps most troublingly, the Court’s 
institutional deference ignored the long history of botched executions 
                                                     
472. See id.  
473. See States with and without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/L62Q-U6DX]. 
The status of Nebraska’s 2015 repeal of the death penalty is uncertain, due to a referendum effort to 
override the repeal. See Paul Hammel, Death Penalty Supporters put Repeal on Hold till 2016 Vote, 
OMAHA.COM (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/death-penalty-supporters-put-
repeal-on-hold-till-vote/article_d713527e-6f20-5903-8654-cc5d283ba47a.html 
[https://perma.cc/XP4H-GJNJ]. 
474. See Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I 
would ask for full briefing on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the 
Constitution.”).  
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and state incompetence in this area. It even ignored voluminous 
evidence that Oklahoma itself had designed the protocol in question 
carelessly. 
The choice of the clearly erroneous standard is probably Glossip’s 
most defensible form of deference. After all, this standard typically 
applies when appellate courts review trial court factual findings, and 
even the dissent accepted its appropriateness. But the Court’s failure to 
engage with serious arguments casting doubt on the propriety of that 
standard, even though the petitioners had argued for a different 
standard,
475
 suggests further that the Court viewed deference not as a 
legal issue to be figured out, but rather as a rhetorical arrow in the 
advocate’s quiver.476 Even more importantly, the Court applied this 
standard so deferentially that it embraced a deeply flawed expert 
witness, brushed aside crucial evidence from the record, and heightened 
the plaintiffs’ burden.477 
That, of course, is the problem with deference determinations more 
generally. The Court’s articulation and application of the standards 
guiding these inquiries are so inconsistent and inchoate that the 
determinations themselves are stealthy and extremely flexible.
478
 As a 
result, the Court can twist the deference to meet its goals in a particular 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Glossip’s use of judicial deference seems awfully cynical. 
Admittedly, some of the Court’s individual deference determinations are 
defensible, but some are not, and collectively they suggest that a 
majority of the Court wanted to shut down this entire area of litigation. 
Over and over again, the Court explained that it owed the benefit of the 
doubt to the district court and to the defendant state officials without 
careful (or, at times, any) consideration of counter-arguments, some of 
which were powerful. Viewed in total, these determinations suggest that 
a majority of the Court decided the outcome it wanted to reach before it 
examined the law or the facts. 
There is a well-documented history of state incompetence in lethal 
injection, yet the Court bent over backwards to give states the benefit of 
the doubt, emphasizing its own epistemic shortcomings and crafting 
                                                     
475. See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 4, at 32. 
476. See Berger, supra note 238, at 725–26. 
477. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
478. See generally Berger, supra note 23, at 472–98. 
04 - Berger.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2016  5:09 PM 
1004 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:929 
 
legal tests minimizing the inmate’s constitutional interests. Despite the 
history of botched executions and state incompetence, the Court still 
deferred. No wonder that non-lawyers are taken aback when they learn 
about the Court’s decision.479 
Glossip heightens the risk of excruciating executions, but it is also not 
good for the judiciary. When the Court plays so fast and loose with these 
kinds of matters, it inevitably triggers questions about its credibility and 
impartiality. This Article critiques one decision, but the larger point is 
that the Court’s failure to theorize and defend its various kinds of 
deference determinations gives it substantial leeway to shape outcomes 
to its liking.
480
 To be clear, certain cases present the judiciary with very 
good reasons to defer. Glossip, though, was not such a case. This 
decision, then, is not a laudable example of judicial restraint but rather 
an abdication of the judiciary’s constitutional responsibility to safeguard 
individual rights. It was Gross error. 
 
                                                     
479. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
480. Cf. Berger, supra note 23, at 494–98. 
